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I.
INTRODUCTION
Give nie your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses yearning
to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. Send
these, the homeless, tempest-tost, to me, I lift my lamp beside the
golden door.'
It was in the spirit of these words that this country dealt with aliens2
for many years after the War of Independence. Aside from two acts
passed in 1798, one of which was limited in its application to wartime,3
and the other of which expired in 1800,4 no attempt was made to place
restrictions on aliens. The westward expansion of the country brought a
pressing need for pioneers and the government was only too happy to accept
those who were willing to come and endure the rigors of colonial life.
The first attempt by Congress to place restraints on immigration was
in 1882, when it levied a head tax on immigrants. 5 The act was subse-
quently upheld as a regulation of foreign commerce in the Head Money
Cases6 but the Court specifically denied that the power exercised was the
taxing power.7
By the year 1882, many thousands of Chinese laborers had entered
this country. Agitation from west coast inhabinants fearful of the Yellow
Horde within their midst resulted in Congress' legislating to exclude
Chinese laborers. s The law did not apply to those presently within the
country. If a Chinese laborer wished to leave the country, he had to
obtain a certificate of identification in order to re-enter. This right of
re-entry was later foreclosed by the Act of October 1, 18889 which pro-
hibited entry to Chinese laborers, with or without a certificate. In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States,'0 the validity of the Act was challenged.
Although the facts of the case presented only the issue of the power of
1. Lazarus, The New Colossus. See MERRIAM, EMMA LAZARUS, WOMAN WITH
A TORCH, 156 (1956). These words are inscribed on a bronze tablet on the Statue
of Liberty in New York harbor--one of the first sights of this country to greet the
immigrant.
2. Cf. Immigration and Nationality Act, (McCarran-Walter Act) § 101 (a) (3), 66
Stat. 166 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (3) (1958).
3. An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, 1 Stat. 577 (1798). This statute remains
today substantially unchanged. See Rgv. STAT. § 4067 (1875), as amended, 40 Stat.
531 (1918), 50 U.S.C. 21 (1958) ; REv. STAT. §§ 4068-70 (1875).
4. An Act Concerning Aliens, 1 Stat. 570 (1798). This act together with the
Sedition Act, passed the same year, met with great unpopularity which was responsible
for its short life.
5. Act of August 3, 1883, 22 Stat. 214 (1883).
6. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 5 S. Ct. 247 (1884).
7. Id. at 595, 5 S. Ct. at 252 ". . . The power exercised in this instance is not
the taxing power. The burden imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is the mere
incident of the regulation of commerce--of that branch of foreign commerce which
is involved in immigration."
8. Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
9. 25 Stat. 504 (1888).
10. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S. Ct. 623 (1889).
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Congress to exclude, the validity of the Act was sustained by the same
reasoning Congress used to justify its passage-a theory of self preserva-
tion." These first few cases laid down the principle of Congressional power
over exclusion of aliens. This power was later accepted and applied in
cases holding valid, acts of Congress dealing not with exclusion-but
expulsion. 12
It is not the purpose of this Note to revisit and to re-analyze the major
cases in the deportation field. This aspect of the problem has been covered
before, much more exhaustively than is possible here.13 It is sufficient,
by way of introduction, to point out that the constitutional analysis used by
the Court has not always been correct or consistent. It is the purpose of
this Note to examine all aspects of, and answer the question-whether the
government of the United States can, consistent with the letter and spirit
of the Constitution under which it functions, deport a lawfully admitted,
long time resident alien, and if so,14 by what procedure.
At this point it is necessary to articulate one distinction of which,
unhappily, the courts have not always been mindful, that is the distinction
between exclusion and expulsion. Congressional power of exclusion is the
power to deny anyone admission to this country. Expulsion is the removal
of a person from this country once he has entered. It is obvious that vastly
different constitutional issues are raised when the full import of these terms
is realized. The courts have confused the power of exclusion with the
11. Id. at 595, 9 S. Ct. at 626. Mr. Justice Field, speaking for a unanimous
court stated: "They remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible for
them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in their habits or modes
of living. As they grew in numbers each year the people of the coast saw, or believed
they saw, . . . great danger that at no distant day that portion of our country would
be overrun by them unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration."
12. The genesis of this notion of Congressional power over expulsion can be
traced to the dicta of Mr. Justice Gray in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 12 S. Ct. 336 (1892). In that case he laid the foundation for the Conditional
Entry theory of expulsion by stating: "It is an accepted maxim of International Law,
that every sovereign nation has power, inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-
preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit
them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit .... In the United
States this power is vested in the national government, to which the Constitution has
committed the entire control of international relations. . . . It . . . may be exercised
either through treaties . . . or through statutes. . . . [T]he Constitution has con-
ferred power [upon Congress] to regulate foreign commerce with foreign nations,
including . . . the bringing of persons into ports of the United States; to establish
a uniform rule of naturalization; and to declare war." Id. at 659, 12 S. Ct. at 338.
(Emphasis added.)
13. See Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent
Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YAL. L. J. 1578 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases] ; Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully
Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel,
69 YAI E L. J. 262 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Hesse, The Power to Expel].
14. One author would argue strenuously against deporting resident aliens for
whatever cause. See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform,
56 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1956). "Once . . . an alien is admitted, his relationship with
the United States should be permanent, not probationary. If he turns out to be a
criminal or a Communist, he is subject to our penal laws. To visit upon him the
additional penalty of deportation is unworthy of a free and powerful country." Id.
at 323.
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power of expulsion; they have accepted the basis of the former as authority
justifying the latter. Presented with a case in which the substantive due
process issue could easily have been reached and decided, the court has
much preferred to take other routes to decision; when the issues have been
reached, it has been in cases involving unpopular classes of aliens, where
the decisions have been easily accepted by the popular notions of the day.
As one authority has stated:
.... "[T]he constitutional issues presented by expulsion have
been considered only in cases involving extremely unpopular groups
of aliens, whose very unpopularity has led to their explicit inclusion
within the orbit of Congressional intent. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the leading immigration cases seriously considering con-
stitutional issues have, in historical order, involved Chinese laborers, 15
anarchists,10 prostitutes," convicted wartime saboteurs, 8 and in the
present decade, ex-communists. 19
Naturally, it cannot be stated that all decisions which conform to the
current public consensus are incorrect. But it is submitted that to deliniate
the rights of lawfully admitted, long time resident aliens by precedent
crystallized during a period of national prejudice is both unfair to the rights
of aliens as a class and inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution
under which all men are supposed to be equal.
The power of Congress to exclude is not here contested. This is a
power inherent in a sovereignty and a power Congress has exercised in
establishing immigration quotas. In this fashion Congress has protected
against any recurrence of a situation such as the Yellow Horde fear of the
late nineteenth century, and has done it without trampling the rights of
any individual. By denying admission to a foreign citizen, this govern-
ment has taken no rights from that person. The person lives under a
system which he has probably endured from birth and the only effect of
the denial of admission is that he must continue to live under it. Expul-
sion, however, presents vastly different issues. While the right to enter is
enjoyed by no alien, the "right to remain" 20 is enjoyed, or at least should
be enjoyed by any lawfully admitted alien.
15. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893) ; Chae
Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S. Ct. 623 (1889).
16. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 24 S. Ct. 719 (1904).
17. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 34 S. Ct. 196 (1914) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 33 S. Ct. 607 (1913).
18. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283 (1924).
19. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S. Ct. 737 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952). Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases, supra note 13,
at 1581.
Of particular note in viewing the cases cited (supra notes 14-18) is not only the
particularly unpopular classes of aliens involved, but the dates when these cases were
decided and the attitude of the country at the time. The cases involving the admission
of Chinese laborers arose in the late 1880's and early 1890's when fear of the Yellow
Horde was rampant. Convicted wartime sabouteurs were dealt with in 1924, just
after the first great global conflict, and more recently, ex-communists were dealt with
in the McCarthy era of the early 1950's.
20. 66 Stat. 175 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (1958).
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An alien could certainly present no greater danger to national security
than does a citizen. By his alienage he is naturally disqualified from any
position of grave national trust. This fact, coupled with the closer tabs
kept on aliens by the government and the far more accurate and scientific
security measures in operation today, leads to the conclusion that any
distinction is neither required nor justified.
But the question is raised, Why should this country accept and keep
the "wretched refuse" of other lands? Why not return to his fatherland
the prostitute, the anarchist, the murderer, the undesirable? The answer is
not difficult. If he was such before he came, he should not have been
admitted initially; if he was not, he is a product of this country. In any
group of citizens, a certain number will commit crimes for which, if they
were aliens, they would be deportable. To allow the mere fact of alienage
to be determinative as to whether a man must suffer for his acts, not only
imprisonment here, but banishment abroad, is both illogical and unjust.
Daily living requires one to accept the bad with the good, which is no less
true of a country than it is of the individual. To make a fact, alienage,
which has no relation to a crime, the basis of a distinction, the consequences
of which can be so disastrous to the individual, violates the entire spirit
of the Constitution.
There is hereinafter presented a detailed comparison of criminal pro-
cedure and the procedure presently used in the deportation of an alien
who has committed a deportable offense. To properly set this comparison
in perspective, it is necessary first to examine several other aspects of the
entire problem. This Note proceeds to examine the sources of the power
to deport focusing on the validity of the power, the nature and effect of
deportation, whether a punishment or a purely civil matter, and the
comparison of criminal and deportation procedures.
I.
DEPORTATION AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Source of the Power to Deport
Constitutional authorization for the power to deport has from the
beginning rested on uncertain grounds. Depending on the period of
United States history under consideration, the power has been implied
from the specfic powers given to the federal government or thought to be
a power inherent in every sovereign state.2 1
21. One authority would classify the sources of implied power as follows: the
war power, the foreign commerce power, the treaty power and sovereignty. Hesse,
The Pre-1917 Cases, 1582. See also Note, The Role of Congress and the Federal
Judiciary in the Exclusion of Aliens, 23 Mo. L. REv. 491 (1958) ; Note, The Alien
and the Constitution, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 547 (1953).
NOTE
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1. Implied and Specific Powers
The Constitution gives no express right to deport. Madison and
Jefferson both thought that the power did not exist except in time of war.22
The ideas of these two great Americans have not prevailed however, and
deportation is now used as freely in peace time as it is in war time, though
perhaps not as frequently. The power has been implied from other powers
given by the Constitution.
The implication of power, at the outset, meets with an objection. The
federal government is one of delegated powers and if the power is not
specifically granted by the Constitution, it is presumed not to exist. This
line of argument is given force by the statement of Chief Justice Mar-
shall in McCulloch v. Maryland:23 "This government is acknowledged by
all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can exercise
only the powers granted to it . . . is now universally admitted." Years
later Chief Justice Waite wrote: "The government of the United States
is one of delegated powers alone. Its authority is defined and limited by
the Constitution. '24 As late as 1907, justice Brewer argued: "The propo-
sition that there are legislative powers affecting the nation as a whole which
belong to, although not expressed in, the grant of power, is in direct
conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated
powers. '25 This line of authority precipitates a search for a specific power
to authorize deportation. The war power was apparently the earliest source
used to justify deportation of aliens. In 1798, the Enemy Alien Act2 6 was
passed and remains in effect today basically unchanged. 27 The power of
deportation under this statute is limited in its application to time of war
or the imminent threat of war.
During such times, the power of the federal government must be
augmented. Acts performed during war time are permitted which, if
done in time of peace would be invalid. Since in time of war the national
security and integrity are the paramount concern and all acts of State are
directed toward their protection, deportation under the authority of the
war power is the easiest accepted justification.
Peace time expulsion presents a different set of standards. Without
the trying conditions of a national crisis and the concomitant necessity of
22. "With respect to aliens who are not enemies, but members of nations in peace
and amity with the United States, the power assumed by the (Alien) Act of
(1798) of Congress is denied to be constitutional .... " Madison, Report on the
Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOTT's DEBATEs 546, 554.
"(A)lien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the
state wherein they are; . . . no power over them has been delegated to the
United States . . . (accordingly) the (Alien) act of (1798) . . . is not law, but
is altogether void and of no force." Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and
1799. id. at 540-41.
23. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
24. United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1876).
25. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 89, 27 S. Ct. 655, 664 (1907).
26. 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
27. See REv. STAT. § 4067 (1875), as amended, 40 Stat. 531 (1918), 50 U.S.C.
21 (1958) ; Rxv. STAT. §§ 4068-70 (1875).
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increased power in the federal government, greater effort should be ex-
pended on the safeguarding of personal rights and the power of deportation,
no matter how justified, should be more critically examined. The power
to regulate peace time immigration was early found to be supported by the
power of Congress over foreign commerce .
2
2. "Power Inherent in Sovereignty"
The real cornerstone of peace time regulation of aliens, however, is
attributable to a "power inherent in sovereignty". 29 It is reasoned that the
United States, being a sovereign government, must necessarily have all the
powers of a sovereignity, whether specifically mentioned in the Constitution
or not. International law recognizes the power of a sovereign to deport"0
and thus, the United States has the power. 31
It must be remembered, however, that this government, though sov-
ereign, is constitutionally established and must act within the framework
of the Constitution. The Constitution thrusts upon the government the
burden of acting with due process of law, in its relations with all persons,
'3 2
including aliens. Hence, the very document which launches the federal
government as a sovereign, also commands that it must not exercise all
the powers enjoyed by other sovereigns and recognized in international
law if those powers would violate due process. Indeed the very body of
International law which sanctions the exercise of the powers also
recognizes the right of a sovereign to give up the power.
There is no doubt that a State need not make use of all the rights it
has by the Law of Nations, and that, consequently, every State can
28. In The Head Money Cases, the court, in holding valid a tax on immigrants,
said:
"[T]he power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The burden
imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is the mere incident of the regulation
of commerce--of that branch of foreign commerce which is involved in immigra-
tion." Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 595, 5 S. Ct. 247, 252 (1884).
29. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 9 S. Ct. 623 (1889) ; Nishi-
mura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 12 S. Ct. 336 (1892) ; Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893) ; Chuoco Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S.
549, 33 S. Ct. 585 (1913); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512
(1952). See also Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1603.
30. ". . . (I)n strict law a state can expel even domiciled aliens without so much
as giving the reasons, the refusal of the expelling State of the expelled alien does not
constitute an illegal, but only a very unfriendly act." 1 OPPENHEI, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 498-502 at 499 (3d ed., Roxburgh, 1920). But cf., 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 630-634 at 631 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948). See also 4 MooiRE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 210-211 (6th ed., Keith, 1929) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698,
13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893).
31. Hesse describes this doctrine of power inherent in sovereignty as "[t]he
highest barrier to a fresh consideration of the long time resident alien's status ....
Hesse, The Pre-1917 Cases 1586.
32. "We have long held that a resident alien is a 'person' within the meaning of
the Fifth and the Fourteenth Amendments." Dissent of Justice Douglas in Harisiades
v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598, 72 S. Ct. 512, 523 (1952).
"While he (an alien) lawfully remains here, he is entitled to the benefit of the
guarantees of life, liberty, and property secured by the Constitution to all persons
of whatever race, within the jurisdiction of the United States." Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S., 538, 547, 15 S. Ct. 967, 971 (1895).
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by its laws expressly renounce the whole or partial use of such rights,
provided always that it is ready to fulfill such duties, if any, as are
connected with those rights.33
The quotation is couched in terms of an express renunciation of the use
of such rights and continues: "[hlowever, when no such renunciation
has taken place, municipal courts ought, if the interests of justice demand
it, to presume that their State has tacitly consented to make use of such
rights."3 4
It is submitted that there is an express renunciation of the blanket
power to deport contained in the Constitution, in form-the due process
clause of the Fifth Amendment. This clause restricts the government
through its requirement to act with justice and fairness in its dealings
with its members. There is no better statement of the dangers of deportation
when justified by a power inherent in sovereignty than the fearful ex-
clamations of Mr. Justice Brewer in Fong Yue Ting :5
Where are the limits to such powers to be found, and by whom are
they to be pronounced? Is it within legislative capacity to declare the
limits? If so, then the mere assertion of an inherent power creates it,
and despotism exists. May the courts established the boundaries?
Whence do they obtain the authority for this? Shall they look to the
practices of other nations to ascertain the limits?
B. Unequal Treatment Under Law
Inability to pinpoint a specific constitutional warrant for deportation,
thus failing to provide the legislature with a clear cut directive, has re-
sulted in a Congressional regulation which, while accurately reflecting the
vascillating attitude of the country toward aliens, ignores and confuses the
basic constitutional issues at stake. This factor coupled with the ever
present stimulus to protect the national security is responsible for unequal
treatment of the alien in some areas.
For the most part the government has recognized a parity of rights
between aliens and citizens. Law and the Constitution render him economic
equality of opportunity with the citizen;36 habeus corpus is available to
safeguard his personal liberty3 7 ; in criminal prosecutions the protections
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are available to both alien and citizen. 8
In the area of property rights no distinction is made unless an enemy alien
is involved and then his property cannot be taken without just compensa-
tion.3 9 A law abiding alien is treated the same as a law abiding citizen.
There are however, some distinctions which must be set forth. An alien
33. 1 OPPENHSIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
34. Ibid.
35. 149 U.S. 698, 737-738, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 1031 (1893).
36. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064 (1886); Truax v. Raich,
234 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7 (1915).
37. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 S. Ct. 336, 338 (1892).
38. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896).
39. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481,.'51 S. Ct. 229 (1931).
[VOL. 8
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is not a citizen and should not be treated as such for certain political pur-
poses, notably voting. In a footnote to the Harisiades decision,4 0 Justice
Jackson summarized the remaining principal areas of disparity as including
the inability to stand for election to many public offices, impairment of the
right to travel outside the United States, owing to restrictions not appli-
cable to citizens, and the absence of a presumption of lawful entry putting
the alien to his proof of the right to enter or remain.
The justice of these disabilities is not completely free of doubt. The
voting disqualifications are certainly warranted in view of the alien's un-
renounced allegiance but the other areas, travel restrictions and the burden
of proof, present fertile areas for discussion and disagreement. It must be
noted, however, that none of the discriminations mentioned have so dis-
astrous and final an effect upon the resident alien as does deportation. None
deprive him directly of the things that "make life worth living."'4' None
tear him from his home, his loved ones, his very way of life and hurl him
to a strange land where he is more an alien in fact, than he was in this
country. The other debilitating effects of deportation need not be detailed
to anyone who has given the subject minimal reflection.
It cannot be argued that simply because deportation has such lasting
and disastrous effects that it 'is therefore wrong. A death sentence is
worse; life imprisonment is worse, but these are accepted. These sen-
tences are imposed as the consequence of an accomplished crime. They
are designed as punishment, social retribution, and for the protection of
society. As such, they offer ample justification for their imposition. A
similar analysis of the justification for deportation presents a far less
satisfying result.
C. International Redress
Paradoxically, the very body of international law which confers on
the sovereign the power to deport affords the deportee only a very limited
scope of remedies. Traditionally only states have standing to complain in
international law. Thus, an individual who alleges injury at the hands of
another sovereign must predicate that state's liability for reparation "on
the fiction that the demanding state has vicariously suffered through the
harm inflicted on its subject. '42 The conditions which summon into
operation this fictional relief are said to be: "(1) [a]n act or omission in
violation of international law (2) which is imputable to the state and (3)
which results in injury to the claimant state either directly or indirectly
through damage to the national. '43 Thus in order to qualify for direct
40. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586, 72 S. Ct. 512, 517 (1952).
41. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S. Ct. 492, 495 (1922).
42. Kutner & Carl, An International Writ of Habeas Corpus: Protection of
Personal Liberty in a World of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 22 U. PITT. L.
REv. 469, 536 (1961).
43. BIras, THE LAW ov NATIONs 615 (2d ed. 1952).
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reparation in the international arena (if it exists at all) 44 the injury to the
alien must be tantamount to an injury to his state.
The United States deportation standards and procedures are not
normally so abusive or arbitrary when measured by international standards
that the uprooted alien may seek redress. The future of international law,
while striving to focus more on the protection of the individual, does not
appear to hold the key to adequate relief.45 In the absence of such a
remedy it is necessary to take a more critical look at our own often
oppressive procedures with a view towards improvement from within-
hopefully revising them to more nearly accord with the fair play traditions
embodied in the due process clause.
D. Deportation as Punishment
Any critical examination of United States deportation law must begin
by probing the conclusion that deportation is not a punishment. This
doctrine forms the cornerstone of all the procedural inequities employed
to deport an alien which offer such a sad commentary on our democratic
traditions exemplified in the due process clause.
The genesis of the concept that deportation is not a punishment,
termed by some a "mammoth fiction", 4 if not "unconscionable" ,47 is an in-
triguing one for legal scholars and humanitarians alike. It has its birth
and growth in deportation cases in which the issue of deprivation of
constitutional rights or procedural due process has been raised. The
judiciary has been generally content to dismiss these objections in one
of three ways. In the one instance it is said that the power to deport is
an exercise of a power inherent in every sovereign state48 (and thus im-
plicitly not subject to constitutional due process protections). The counter-
part of this argument states that deportation partakes of the foreign rela-
tions power. 49 In either event, owing to the overriding interest in national
44. Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of
Universal International Law? 55 AM. J. INT.'I, L. 863 (1961).
45. There has been considerable discussion in recent years on the question of
standing of an individual in international law. Among the most vocal champions of
the cause for protection of human rights through international law is Luis Kutner.
He argues for the establishment of an international writ of habeas corpus which would
rescue the alien from an arbitrary or illegal detention. The writ, however, would not
lie if ". . . under all the factual conditions and circumstances existing within the
particular arena, the continued detention of the petitioner is reasonable." Kutner &
Carl supra note 42 at 539. The scope of the writ, while not broad enough to cover
pre or post deportation hearing detentions in the United States, does represent a sig-
nificant step towards the defense of human rights on an international basis. Hope-
fully the defense will be further implemented by the recognition of a set of standards
for international due process and strengthened by the confidence of all signatories.
See also Kutner, World Habeas Corpus for International Man: A Credo for Inter-
national Due Process of Man, 36 U. D4T. L. J. 235 (1959) ; Kutner, World Habeas
Corpus: A Legal Absolute for Survival, 39 U. DET. L. J. 279 (1962).
46. Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. CrY L. Rnv. 213 (1959).
47. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
L. Rev. 309, 321 (1956).
48. See note 28 supra.
49. See case cited in note 29 supra.
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security, the government's deportation process violates no known consti-
tutional (or extra-constitutional) procedural safeguards so long as the
proceeding is not arbitrary.50
The third justification that recurs, apparently as a satisfactory disposi-
tion of recognized constitutional rights, is that deportation is not a punish-
ment.5' The cases that reach this conclusion analyze the issue in terms of the
sovereign power which supports the deportation order. The argument is
premised on the inherent power of every sovereign to exclude and expel
aliens. The threat of deportation is a method whereby the sovereign can
secure the compliance of the alien with the Congressionally imposed con-
ditions which determine his continued residence in this country. The power
can be delegated to executive officers and when not exercised unreasonably
constitutes due process.
1. The Sovereign Power Theory
This theory is the product of the Fong Yue Ting52 decision, which is
apparently the first case raising the issue of deportation as a punishment.
Petitioner, a Chinese laborer, was arrested pursuant to the Chinese Exclu-
sion Act 53 which prescribed deportation for Chinamen who failed to obtain
a residence certificate from the Secretary of the Treasury. In sustaining
the deportation order Mr. Justice Gray speaking for the majority stated:
The order of deportation is not punishment for crime. It is but a
method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who
has not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which
the government of the nation, acting within its constitutional authority,
and through the proper departments has determined that his continu-
ing to reside here shall depend. He has not, therefore, been deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law .... 54
A later case5 5 brought under the same Act followed a similar line of reason-
ing in countering an attack by petitioner that deportation was in the nature
of punishment and therefore could not be imposed without a trial type
hearing. The justification was expressed by describing the source of the
power exercised. Relying on Fong Yue Ting the court classified the right to
exclude or expel aliens as the "inherent and inalienable" right of every
sovereign.5 The third important case deciding this point was Bugajewitz
v. Adams.57 Petitioner was being deported pursuant to a statute making
50. See Section III. of this Note for a fuller discussion of this point.
51. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952), Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1951) and cases cited in note 57 infra.
52. 149 U.S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016 (1893).
53. Chinese Exclusion Act, 27 Stat. 25 (1892).
54. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 1028-29
(1893).
55. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S. Ct. 977 (1896).
56. Id. at 231, 16 S. Ct. at 978-79.
57. 228 U.S. 585, 33 S. Ct. 607 (1913). This case is frequently cited for the
proposition that deportation is not a punishment when this conclusion is reached
through the "sovereign power" route. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v.
NOTE
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prostitution, when practised by an alien, a deportable offense. 58 The punish-
ment issue was squarely before the court because on the same facts peti-
tioner could have been convicted of the crime of prostitution. 9 That Con-
gress intended deportation as a punishment, and in so doing was exercising
its police power rather than its sovereign power, is manifest in the close
wording of the statute. Section three 0 of the statute makes the procurer
and keeper of the house guilty of a felony and (without paragraph or
separation of any kind) declares in the same breath that the alien is deport-
able. To argue that in the same act Congress was using its foreign relations
power in one sentence and its police power in another sentence is untenable
and unrealistic."' None the less Mr. Justice Holmes relinquished this op-
portunity for fresh analysis of the problem in favor of following his prede-
cessors holding, "The determination by facts that might constitute a crime
under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is deportation a punish-
ment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons whom it
doesn't want."0
62
Contrary to what is frequently stated0 3 this trilogy of cases does not
stand for the proposition that deportation is not a punishment; actually
they merely demonstrate that when Congress deports it is exercising its
sovereign power as distinguished from its police power. Implicit in the
sovereign power theory is the assumption that Congress cannot punish
except when it employs its police power in creating a crime. Because it is
utilizing its sovereign power, no crime is created and it would appear that
no matter what the sanction-no punishment is therefore imposed. This,
succinct syllogistic approach ignores the basic issue: whether in fact the
alien is punished for acting contrary to the exacting commands of the Im-
migration Act.
Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283
(1924) ; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 65 S. Ct. 1443 (1945) ; Skeffington v. Katzeff,
277 Fed. 129 (1st Cir. 1922) (semble); United States v. Chan Nom Gee, 47 F.2d 758
(W.D. Wash. 1931) ; Soewapadji v. Wixon, 157 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Moncado
v. Rumsely, 167 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Bridges v. United States, 199 F.2d 811
(9th Cir. 1952) ; Marcello v. Kennedy, 194 F. Supp. 750 (D.D.C. 1961).
58. 34 Stat. 899 (1907), as amended, 36 Stat. 263 (1910) extending the statute of
limitations.
59. The statute prohibits an alien from practising prostitution, from participating
in the earnings resulting from prostitution and from in any way assisting or protect-
ing from arrest any prostitute under threat of deportation. Supra note 58. These
are generally the elements of the crime of prostitution as well as the punishment
meted out to aiders and abettors under most state criminal statutes. See 3 BURDICK,
LAW OF CRIME § 973 (1946).
60. Supra note 58.
61. The contrast i clearer in the original statute which separates the two provisions
of the statute by a semicolon only. Section three of the Act reads in part as follows:
[W]hoever shall directly or indirectly, import or attempt to import, into the
United States, any alien for the purpose of prostitution . . .shall, in every such
case be deemed guilty of a felony ...; and any alien woman or girl who shall
be found an inmate of a house of prostitution or practising prostitution ...
shall be deported.... § 3, 34 Stat. 899 (1907).
62. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S. Ct. 607, 608 (1913).
63. See cases cited in note 57 supra.
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2. The "Civil Proceeding" Justification
The second justification for the proposition that deportation is not a
punishment introduces the factor of classifying the proceedings which pro-
duce the deportation order. The examination concludes that since the
procedure is civil in form, no punishment results. Analytically such a justi-
fication would seem to be a secondary precept flowing from the sovereign
power theory. Invariably the designation of the proceeding as criminal or
civil will depend upon the power used to create it. Nevertheless, the courts
have preferred to treat this as a separate rationale and will be considered
as such here.
In its most standard form, the alien raises procedural due process
objections which would present grave constitutional issues were he being
tried for a crime, but the contentions are rejected by labelling the deporta-
tion proceeding civil in nature. This thinking is typified in an early case,
Zakonaite v. Wolf. 6 4 Petitioner was found to be practising prostitution
within three years after her entry. She contested the constitutionality of
the summary proceeding on the ground that she was denied a speedy
public trial by an impartial jury. The court held that a proceeding to en-
force immigration regulations was not a criminal prosecution within the
meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. A number of the more
important procedural due process protections have been rejected under
this rationale. 5
A new tangent to this approach has appeared more recently in Carlson
v. Landon.66 This was a review of habeas corpus proceedings instituted
by four aliens which involved the legality of detaining the aliens without bail
in deportation proceedings. In affirming a denial of the writ, Mr. Justice
Reed appeared to conclude that deportation was not a criminal proceeding
(and therefore no punishment was inflicted) by examining the form of
the proceeding, observing that no jury sits and there is no judicial review
guaranteed by the Constitution.6 7 This analysis recedes farther from the
basic issue by favoring a conclusion based upon a cursory survey of the
components of the hearing in place of determining what effect, punitive or
otherwise, deportation might have upon the alien.
3. Additional Effects of the Doctrine
Whether by label or form, designating the deportation hearing as a
civil proceeding denies to the alien additional safeguards, which, though
not elevated to the dignity of constitutional protections, are well
established elements of our criminal jurisprudence. In a deportation hear-
ing there is no burden of persuasion comparable to the "beyond a reason-
64. 226 U.S. 272, 33 S. Ct. 31 (1912).
65. See Section III. of this Note.
66. 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952).
67. Id. at 537, 72 S. Ct. at 533.
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able doubt" standard used in a criminal case ;68 what might be termed the
equivalent of the presumption of innocence in such a proceeding, a pre-
sumption of citizenship casting on the government the burden of coming
forward with the evidence, has been rejected.69 The common law doctrine
of coercion70 which would excuse a wife from criminal liability for any act
resulting from her husband's force or threat of force 71 is not available to
the alien in a deportation hearing.72
4. Deportation as Punishment-Effect on the Alien
Therefore, it is submitted, that to answer the question whether de-
portation is a punishment, the examination must proceed, not in terms of
the power exercised or the nature of the proceedings, but rather on the
effect of deportation on the alien. In essence deportation is a punishment
if the alien is punished. It thus becomes material to inquire what constitutes
punishment.
(a) Argument from Definition. The attorney who takes great refuge in
the argument from definition will find resort to the dictionary unavailing
and incongruous. As one author has demonstrated, reference to Black's
Law Dictionary is a lexicographer's and a logician's nightmare.73 Black
confronts us with three seemingly irreconcilable propositions: Deportation
is banishment, banishment is punishment, but deportation is not a punish-
ment. It is this basic semantic exposition which demonstrates most boldly
the glaring inconsistencies in our treatment of deportation; yet, it fails us
in a determination of what an individual must undergo before he is punished
in contemplation of law.
The writers in the field of penology furnish some clue as to the elements
of a punishment. The late Professor Sutherland has stated that there are
two essential ideas contained in the concept of punishment ". . . (a) It is
inflicted by the group in its corporate capacity upon one who is regarded
as a member of the same group, (b) punishment involves pain or suffering
produced by design and justified by some value that the suffering is as-
stined to have. . . -14 Other writers are substantially in agreement with
the proposition that punishment involves some form of pain or suffering,
75
and on this point dictionaries concur in identifying suffering with punish-
ment.70
68. See Section III., K. of this Note.
69. United States v. Chan Nom Gee, 47 F.2d 758 (W.D. Wash. 1931).
70. The doctrine has been imported into legislative penal enactments. See, e.g.,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (1955).
71. See generally 1 BURDICK, LAW O CRIME § 162-65 (1946).
72. lku Kono Ishihama v. Carr, 81 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1936).
73. See generally Navasky, Deportation as Punishment, 27 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 213, 216-18 (1959).
74. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 256 (3d rev. ed. 1955).
75. See, e.g., Privette, Theories of Punishment, 29 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 46
(1961), where the author defines crime as "the violation of a standard which the
community demands be observed and for which violation satisfaction is exacted. This
group-sanctioned satisfaction for a wrong done a member of the group is punishment,
which in its root 'poena' includes pain or suffering of some form."
76. WEBSTER, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1959).
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Judicial definitions of punishment complete the inquiry by denominat-
ing not only what punishment is but also by endeavoring to answer the
related question of what will constitute pain or suffering in a legal sense.
The classical judicial treatise on punishment is propounded in Cummings
v. Missouri. Mr. Justice Field states that the theory upon which our
political institutions rest is that all men have certain inalienable rights,
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness being numbered among them. He
concludes, ". . . the protection of these are all equal before the law. Any
deprivation or suspension of any of these rights for past conduct is punish-
ment and can be in no otherwise defined."'7 8 Other judicial definitions.
have followed Cummings in seeing as elementary to a punishment the
deprivation of a right.7 9 Still other definitions have approved of pain and
suffering as the elements.80
Thus to punish an individual there must be pain or suffering either
actually or in the legal sense through the deprivation of some civil right.
Aliens are invested with nearly all the civil rights of citizens with the
exception of the franchise. It is clear that all the civil rights conferred by
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights upon "persons" apply to the alien.
And while common law rights are conferred by the states, generally it is
true that an alien may hold and dispose of personal property ;81 with some
statutory variations, may hold and dispose of real property, 82 is free to
marry and has the right to engage in the trades3 or occupation 84 of his choice
and that these rights were established very early in this country's history.
Deportation severs an alien from his roots and rights alike, yet we
are reluctant to recognize this deprivation as a punishment. 85 The reports
are full of cases illustrating the injustice-of this position. The tragic story
77. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
78. Id. at 321, 322.
79. "The deprivation of any civil right for past conduct is punishment for such
conduct." State ex rel. Reid v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, 390, 24 S.W. 457, 458 (1893).
"To constitute a 'punishment' or 'penalty' there must be deprivation of property
or some right such as the enjoyment of liberty." State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3
N.W. 2d 176, 179, 182 (1942).
80. "'Punishment' is generally defined as pain or any other penalty inflicted on
a person for a crime or an offense by an authority to which the offender is subject."
Fowler v. American Mail Line Ltd., 69 F.2d 905, 907 (9th Cir. 1934). To the same
effect: Gunning v. People, 86 11. App. 174 (1899); McIntyre v. Commonwealth, 154
Ky. 149, 156 S.W. 1058, 1059 (1913) ; State v. Pope, 79 S. C. 87, 60 S.E. 234, 237
(1908).
81. Braga v. Braga, 314 Mass. 666, 51 N.E. 2d 429 (1943) ; Jackson ex deni.
Fitz Simmons v. Fitz Simmons, 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 9 (right to bequeath); M'Learn
v. Wallace, 10 U.S. (Pet.) 625 (1836) (receive it as next of kin) ; Cosgrove v.
Cosgrove, 69 Conn. 416, 38 Atl. 219 (1897) (receive it as legatee).
82. See e.g., N. Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 10; CAL. CIVIL CODE § 671.
83. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S. Ct. 7 (1915) (holding invalid under the
equal protection clause a state law requiring 80% of the workers to be native-born
where five or more are employed at any one time.)
84. Templar v. State Examiners, 131 Mich. 254, 90 N.W. 1058 (1902) (State
may not deny issuance of barber's license on grounds of alienage). However, a
requirement that applicants for admission to the bar be citizens has been thought
justifiable. In re Takuii Yamashita, 30 Wash. 234, 70 Pac. 482 (1902).
85. United States.ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952).
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of Ignatz Mezei s 6 graphically presents only one conclusion-that deportation
is punishment. He was born on Gibraltar in 1897, immigrated to this country
in 1923 and resided here for twenty-five years. He settled in Buffalo, New
York where he married, acquired a home and plied his trade as a carpenter.
In 1948 he sailed for Rumania to visit his dying mother. On his return to
this country in 1950 he was refused re-entry and confined to Ellis Island.
Later, the Attorney General ordered Mezei permanently excluded without
a hearing on the grounds that the information, which formed the basis of
the order, was confidential. Mezei was virtually a prisoner at Ellis Island for
two years pending disposition of his habeas corpus s7 petition, which was
finally denied.8  Yet without a hearing this man was and still may be
incarcerated by the United States Immigration Authority.8 9 In 1953 he
made application for admission to twenty-five countries, seventeen of
which have rejected himY0 There is no information available indicating
whether or not he ever left the Island.9 1
Karl Assari Latva92 came to this country from Finland at the age of
thirteen. At the time of his hearing he had been married thirty years,
and had sired two sons both of whom were honorably discharged from
service in World War II. He was a loom fixer of good reputation and
had never been arrested for more than minor traffic violations. After thirty-
four years residence Mr. Latva was ordered deported for his six-month
membership in the Communist Party to which he had contributed a total
of ninety cents and whose aims he understood to be organizing unions and
helping strikers. He had no knowledge that the party advocated the violent
overthrow of the United States Government.93 These cases do not stand
alone.9 4 Random samplings of most deportation cases record similar find-
86. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208, 73 S. Ct. 625,
627 (1953). For a discussion of this case see Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of
Substantive Due Process, 28 WASH. L. Rlv. 205, 210-13 (1953).
87. See dissenting opinion of Black, J., id. at 216, 73 S. Ct. at 631.
88. Shaughnessy v. United States, ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S. Ct. 625 (1953).
89. See dissenting opinion of Jackson, J., id. at 220, 73 S. Ct. at 633.
90. New York Times, Apr. 23, 1953, p. 1.
91. Letter to C. Clark Hodgson, Jr., Villanova Law Review from William J.
King, District Director of Immigration and Naturalization Service, July 5, 1963.
92. Latva v. Nicholls, 106 F. Supp. 658, 659-60 (D. Mass. 1952).
93. Deportation for Mr. Latva was prevented by executive intervention presum-
ably attributable to the national publicity given the case. This has been termed by
one author as "a dispensation not of justice but of mercy." Bullitt supra note 86 at
210 note 30.
94. See, e.g., Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703 (1957). Respond-
ent resided in the United States for thirty years, married and had two children. Except
for some liquor law violations during prohibition, he had a good record as a citizen.
He Was ordered deported as having been twice convicted of and sentenced for a crime
involving moral turpitude-conspiracy to defraud the Federal government of liquor
taxes. Thus, what would have amounted to a two-year prison term as punishment
had a citizen committed the same offenses-for an alien was the prison term plus
deportation.
In Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 751 (1955) petitioner was brought
to this country at the age of eight months and was a resident here forty-four years.
His wife and four children were American citizens. The alien was convicted of vio-
lating the Marihuana Tax Act (26 U.S.C. § 2591), sentenced to a year's imprison-
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ings. Yet, courts will continue to distress humanitarians and historians
(and leave unimpressed our lawmakers) with statements to the effect that
while the effects of deportation may be devastating they are not punishing.
Mr. Will Maslow traces the punishing effect of a deportation two steps
further. He points to the painful election the American born spouse and
children of a deportee must make: "either to abandon their native land
and follow their alien parent to some foreign country or to abandon their
parent and remain in this country." 95 For those who choose the latter,
society is saddled with the additional burden of providing for the deportee's
dependents who may take their place on the relief rolls.96
(b) Argument from History. History provides a fruitful accompani-
ment to often sterile logical analysis. In this setting it reveals the place of
banishment as punishment as historians and civilizations have most naturally
classified it.
Set in its historical context, punishment has and still manifests itself
in several forms: death, physical torture, fine, imprisonment, probation,
parole, banishment, transportation and social degradation. The latter is
expressed today in the deprivation of a civil right, for example, suffrage
and the right to hold public office. 97
Banishment or some type of community separation as a form of
punishment has been known since the earliest tribal civilizations. In 509
B.C. Cleisthenes is said to have introduced the practise in Greece as a
means of disposing of prominent persons guilty of criminal acts.98 Later
it was imposed for treasonable offenses. Development of banishment as a
punishment in Rome took more rapid strides. Initially reserved for political
offenders, soon it became the fate of transgressors of the more notorious
crimes: adultery, murder, poisoning and embezzlement. 99 It was England
that molded banishment as a modern form of punishment under the less
offensive title-transportation. Several causes concurred to occasion its
ment, and ordered deported under the authority of section 241 (a) (11) of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act making such a conviction at anytime the grounds for deportation.
The three petitioners in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512
(1952), were charged with violations of the Alien Registration Act of 1940 stemming
from their Communist associations which they had severed prior to the passage of the
Act. Harisiades was a resident of thirty-six years, married with two children.
Mascitti, a resident of thirty-two years, was married with one child while Mrs.
Colemon lived in this country thirty-eight years and reared three children. All were
ordered deported. United States ex rel. Matranga v. Mackey, 210 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.
1954) (Resident alien of seventeen years deported for initially entering without visa
and proper inspection.) ; Giacomo v. Pederson, 289 F.2d 483 (6th Cir. 1961) (Resi-
dent alien of fifty-one years ordered deported for conviction of two crimes involving
moral turpitude-receiving stolen property and larceny. These convictions occurred
after forty-eight years of an apparently good record as a United States resident).
95. Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM.
L. REv. 309, 324 (1956).
96. Ibid. The author cites one Congressional District where two hundred such
families are being aided at a cost to the taxpayer of $300,000 per year.
97. See generally SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY, 262-79 (3d rev. ed.
1955) ; 125 ANNALS, THE AMERICAN ACADEMY Or POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE-
"The Content of Punishment" 229 Robinson, (ed. Clark) (1926).
98. GILLIN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 389 (3d ed. 1935).
99. Navasky, supra note 73 at 219.
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use for the first time in the 1700's.100 The "growth of crime, the inade-
quacy of old methods of punishment and the unsuitability of the old local
jails" created a need for a new type of punishment. 0 1 Moreover, respond-
ing to the humanitarian impulses of its penal reforming conscience, Eng-
land ". . . hoped to achieve by less repellent methods than by the gallows
the evacuation of the most dangerous elements from ... the community.' u0 2
Ultimately thirty-eight felonies and ninety-six misdemeanors were punish-
able by transportation. 0 3 Australia and the United States served as the
desired countries for England's undesirable countrymen.
The War of Independence marked the end of transportation either to
or from this country1 ° 4 Since that time banishment as a form of punish-
ment has had a scanty history in the United States.0 5 In Massachusetts,
intense religious intolerance of dissenters from rigid Puritan standards
resulted in numerous banishnents from the colony, notably Roger Williams
in 1635 and Anne Hutchinson in 1638.106 Despite its unpopularity as a
punitive measure, from these colonial beginnings banishment has always
been recognized as punishment and imposed as such except where aliens
have been involved. The cases on banishment are sparse but their tenor
indicates some judicial hesitancy to impose the penalty. Absent specific
statutory and constitutional authority, banishment as punishment for a
citizen has been held void.'0 A conditional sentence-that is, departure
from the jurisdiction when given as an alternative to a more common form
of punishment such as imprisonment-has the approval of several earlier
cases.' 0 8 The recent and more realistic decisions, reflecting the rehabilita-
tive ideal in punishment have seen banishment as nothing more than a
transfer rather than a solution of the criminal's problem and accordingly
have invalidated such a sentence. 10 9 While it is true that banishment as a
"cruel and unusual" punishment within the meaning of the constitutional
100. Radzinowicz, Changing Attitudes Towards Crime and Punishment, 75 L. Q.
RE:v. 381, 387 (1959). See also Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 74 at 259-272.
101. Gillen, op. cit. supra note 98, at 360.
102. Radzinowicz, supra note 100 at 393.
103. Id. at 388.
104. Ibid.
105. This is, of course, aside from the banishment of aliens which is euphemistically
distinguished by the use of the word "deportation."
106. HIcKs, THE FED4RAL UNION (1957) 31-32.
107. State v. Baker, 58 S. C. 111, 36 S.E. 501 (1900) ; Bernstein v. Jennings, 231
Iowa 1280, 4 N.W.2d 428 (1942); People v. Baum, 251 Mich. 187, 231 N.W. 95(1930). In the latter case Justice Potter unwittingly notes that "Deportation of the
nationals of foreign countries is a popular method of punishing undesirable aliens who
commit crimes against the United States. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 96.
108. Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29, 28 Pac. 109 (1883); State ex rel. Davis v.
Hunter, 124 Iowa 569, 100 N.W. 510 (1904) ; State ex rel. O'Connor v. Wolfer, 53
Minn. 135, 54 N.W. 1065 (1893).
109. Application of Newbern, 168 Cal. App. 2d 472, 335 P.2d 948 (1959) ; People
v. Cortez, 199 Cal. App. 2d. 839, 19 Cal. Rptr. 50 (1962); State v. Doughtie, 237
N.C. 434, 74 S.E.2d 925 (1953). See 6 S.C.L.Q. 229 (1953) ; 32 N. C. L. REv. 221
(1954).
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prohibition has been rejected,110 no court has or will deny that it is never-
theless a punishment, where aliens are not involved."'
III.
DEPORTATION: PROCEDURE AND DUE PROCESS
Whatever the authorization, Congress possesses and extensively exer-
cises the power to deport. It is the manner of its exercise that now calls
for more critical examination. The courts have virtually disclaimed any
responsibility for the procedures used to deport, and have instead delivered
plenary powers to Congress by affirming that due process is what Congress
chooses to make it." 2 As a result Congress has fashioned its own brand of
procedural due process for the alien in a deportation proceeding. This has
engendered the development of two types of due process-Congressional
and Constitutional. The former is choked in the administrative and legis-
lative machinery, while the latter is cultivated and vigorously protected by
the judiciary in a manner befitting a constitutional court. When the courts
are summoned to halt this dualism they refuse on the grounds that depor-
tation is not punishment. The contrast between criminal and alien due
process is clearly demonstrated in the following step by step comparison
which matches the procedural protections afforded the accused against
those available to the alien at a similar point in a deportation proceeding.
Consideration is also given to the constitutional defenses to a criminal
prosecution-that the statute creating the offenses is void for vagueness
or is an ex post facto law. No reference is made to the grand or petit
juries. While they are characteristic of our criminal justice and of un-
questioned value in assuring the accused of a fair hearing, there is nothing
remotely similar to or worthy of comparison with these institutions in
deportation proceedings.
A. Ascertainable Standards
It seems to be well established that a criminal statute that is vague is
unconstitutional in that it provides no ascertainable standards to determine
guilt."' Mr. Justice Warren succinctly stated the proposition:
The Constitutional requirement of definiteness is violated by a criminal
statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice
that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute. The under-
lying principle is that no man shall be held criminally responsible for
conduct which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed.Y4
110. Ex parte Sheehan, 100 Mont. 244, 49 P.2d 438 (1935).
111. See generally Armstrong, Banishient: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 111
U. PA. L. REv. 758 (1963).
112. Shaughnessy v. United States e.r rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S. Ct. 625(1953) United States cx rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309(1950) United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 25 S. Ct. 644 (1905).
113. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S. Ct. 808 (1954). See also,
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S. Ct. 618 (1939).
114. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812 (1954).
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The Supreme Court has also ruled that a criminal penalty need not
be involved in order for a citizen to take advantage of this "void for vague-
ness" doctrine.115 For the Court Mr. Justice Van Devanter argued that
it was error to try to distinguish cases which held a statute void for vague-
ness merely because criminal sanctions were involved. The essence of the
"void for vagueness" doctrine is the requirement of obedience to a standard
which is indeterminable. It is relatively easy to visualize a civil standard
that would not satisfy the above test." 6  A
Aliens have sought the constitutional shield of the "void-for-vague-
ness" doctrine in their attempts to avoid deportation. In Jordan v. De
George,"7 an alien challenged the validity of his deportation on these
grounds. The statute in question provided that an alien may be deported
from the United States "[who] at any time after entry is convicted of two
crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme of
criminal misconduct, regardless of whether confined therefor and regardless
of whether the convictions were in a single trial."1 18 This was held not to
be "void-for-vagueness." There seems to be little doubt since Jordan'1 9
that the phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" satisfies the due process
test. True, there are times when courts will argue that a specific set of
facts does or does not involve moral turpitude, but no court seems con-
cerned with whether or not there is a deficiency in the phrase itself.1 20
In a recent case,1 21 a resident alien was sought to be deported on the
ground that he was "afflicted with psychopathic personality.1 22 The de-
fendant was said to be a homosexual and that such a condition rendered
him a psychopathic personality-a class of alien deportable under the terms
of the act. The Circuit Court, applying the basic constitutional principles
held:
The conclusion is inescapable that the statutory term "psychopathic
personality," when measured by common understanding and practices,
does not convey sufficiently definite warning that homosexuality and
sex perversion are embraced therein. Since this statutory term thus
fails to meet the test to be applied in determining whether a statute
is vague in the constitutional sense, we hold that the statute is void for
115. Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233, 45 S. Ct. 295 (1925).
116. Id. at 239, 45 S. Ct. at 297.
117. 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703 (1951). The Court found, however, that the
phrase "crime involving moral turpitude" was definite enough.
118. § 241(a) (4), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (4) (1958).
119. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 71 S. Ct. 703 (1951).
120. See in this connection: United States ex rel. Giglio v. Neelly, 208 F.2d 337(7th Cir. 1953) (Counterfeiting pennies and nickels and passing the same did not
involve moral turpitude) ; Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) ; (A
conviction for attempting to evade taxes, where fraud is charged in the indictment
is a crime involving moral turpitude.) Neither case considered the fact that the
statute was deficient itself although it could be argued that by saying in Neelly that
the facts did not constitute moral turpitude, the court was avoiding the problem as
to whether the statute was "void for vagueness".
121. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
122. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a) (1), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1) (1958); § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a) (4) (1958).
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vagueness, as applied in this case. Enforcement of the deportation
order would therefore deprive Fleuti of the due process of law. 123
The Supreme Court, however, did not view the case in the same
light.12 4 Mr. Justice Goldberg, for the Court, refused to address the consti-
tutional issue of whether the term psychopathic personality was "void for
vagueness". Instead, he noted that in order for section 1182 (a) (4)-
the psychopathic personality provision-to be operative, Fleuti must have
been excludable, that is, a psychopathic personality, at the time of his entry
into this country. 125 The entry in question occurred following a short pleas-
ure visit to Mexico. The Court, after interpreting the definition of entry,12
ruled that this fell outside the proscribed class and vacated the judgment
with directions to the lower court to make a further investigation as to
why Fleuti took the trip.
It could very well be that the Court was thinking only of statutory
construction. In that view of the case the Fleuti decision is not good news
for the alien. However, underlying the case could be a feeling on the part
of the Court that some provisions of the Immigration Act must be liberally
construed to protect the alien. The Court evidently was not ready for the
constitutional question, but some language in the opinion is interesting.
"The more civilized application of our immigration laws given recognition
by Congress in § 101 (a) (13) and other provisions of the 1952 Act protects
the resident alien from unsuspected risks and unintended consequences of
such wholly innocent action."'1 27 This decision could very well represent
the first step in a tide of judicial humanitarianism which will seek to amend
the most unfavorable and illogical deportation precedents developed in the
"pink" climate of the early 1950's.
B. Ex Post Facto Clause
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed". 128 Al-
though many laymen and some lawyers argue that this prohibition should
apply to all laws with retroactive application, be they civil or criminal, it was
established very early in our history that the constitutional ban against
ex post facto legislation applies only to criminal legislation.129 Justice
Patterson stated the rule as follows: "The words, ex post facto, when
applied to a law, have a technical meaning, and, in legal phraseology, refer
to crimes, pains, and penalties.' 30 This formula has held sway in the area
of ex post facto legislation since the date of its utterance. Thus a person,
123. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962).
124. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 83 S. Ct. 1804 (1963).
125. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a) (13), 66 Stat. 166 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(13) (1958).
126. Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 83 S. Ct. 1803, 1807-08 (1963).
127. See generally Wasserman, The Universal Ideal of Justice and Our lIntgi-
gration Laws, 34 NOTRE DADE LAW. 1 (1958) ; Hesse, The Power to Expel. See also
38 N. Y. U. L. R~v. 1 (1963).
128. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
129. Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
130. Id. at 396.
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in order to receive protection under the ex post facto clause, must show the
court that the law he is held in violation of made criminal an act
which was innocent when done, or which inflicted a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed.' 13  The fundamental
unfairness of this type of legislation is recognized in American constitu-
tional theory. Although the prohibition against ex post facto laws bars
only retroactive criminal statutes, the courts have often reached similar
results with civil legislation through the impairment of contracts, and due
process clauses."'1 3
2
Many resident aliens have employed the ex post facto doctrine attempt-
ing to rescue themselves from deportation under the McCarran-Walter
Act."1 3  "However, these challenges invariably have been vanquished. The
reasoning has been that the ex post facto inhibition applies only to criminal
statutes, and is thus inapplicable to expulsion laws, since they are civil and
not criminal in nature." 134
Mr. Justice Holmes, some years ago seems to have laid the matter to
rest. After establishing that Congress has power to order the deportation
of aliens, he concluded that "[t]he determination by facts that might con-
stitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of crime, nor is the
deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor
persons whom it does not want .... The prohibition of ex post facto laws
in article I, § 9, has no application. '13 5 Hence, since retroactive laws or
results under the deportation acts have been considered civil rather than
penal, they do not comport with the requirements of the ex post facto
doctrine, that is, that they be criminal in nature. Such a view has held
steady command from the beginnings of deportation law.
In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," 6 the Court held that a provision au-
thorizing deportation of resident aliens because of membership in the
Communist party terminating before enactment of the act was not ground
for invalidating the act. Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority,
emphasized the old arguments, namely, that the ex post facto clause,
through history had applied only to criminal legislation and that deporta-
tion proceedings had for years been classified merely as a civil proceeding.
In reading between the lines one might surmise that Jackson himself might
have felt differently were he deciding the question ab initio, but because
131. Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
132. Leedom v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 278 F.2d 237, 240 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). The court says here that if one wants to have the ex post facto clause
applied, he must show that the legislation is of a criminal nature, otherwise some
other Constitutional provision must be applied to achieve the desired result.
133. Pub. L. No. 414, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (June 27, 1952).
134. GORDON & ROSFNFIILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 403 (1962). [here-
inafter cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD].
135. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S. Ct. 607, 608 (1913). See
section III. B. of this Note for a more complete discussion of this point.
136. 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952).
[VOL. 8
23
Editors: Resident Aliens and Due Process: Anatomy of a Deportation
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
SUMMER 1963]
of the array of precedents facing the Court a far less desirable result was
reached.' 37
In Marcello v. Bonds,138 the petitioner, a resident alien, was ordered
deported under the authority of the Immigration Act of 1952. In essence
that section states that an alien who had at any time been convicted of a
narcotics violation could presently be deported. Among other things the
petitioner urged that this was retroactive legislation. Mr. Justice Clark
replied simply, "We perceive no special reasons, however, for overturning
our precedents on this matter.' u3
9
Galvan v. Press,140 while primarily of interest on the constitutionality
of the Internal Security Act of 1950, is a case whose enunciated principles
have a significant bearing on this subject. Petitioner contended that making
his past Communist affiliations a deportable offense under the Act violated
the ex post facto clause. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
seemed to foreclose the matter to further judicial discussion stating:
• ..And since the intrinsic consequences of deportation are so close
to punishment for crime, it might fairly be said also that the ex post
facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive legislation, should
be applied to deportation .... But the slate is not clean. As to the extent
of the power of Congress under review, there is not merely "a page
of history" but a whole volume .... But that the formulation of these
policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as
firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body
politic as any aspect of our government. And whatever may have
been said at an earlier date for applying the ex post facto Clause, it
has been the unbroken rule of this Court, that it has no application to
deportation.14 '
So far, ex post facto arguments as applied to deportation have been
futile.' 42 One would think that taking an alien away from his family, his
friends and his property for an act performed many years before in inno-
cence and without sanction is punishment in its most horrible sense. This
view is not without its proponents. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,143 disregarded the history of the ex post facto
clause and concerned himself mainly with the practical aspects of deporta-
tion. His basic argument was that whether or not one calls deportation
proceedings punishment really does not solve the problem. 4 4 By its nature
and its consequences deportation must be considered punishment. Men
may be taken from their wives and children, life plans may be scrapped,
137. Id. at 594, 72 S. Ct. at 521 (1952).
138. 349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955).
139. Id. at 314, 75 S. Ct. at 764 (1955).
140. 347 U.S. 522, 74 S. Ct. 737 (1954).
141. Id. at 531, 74 S. Ct. at 742-43 (1954).
142. See also Lehmann v. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 77 S. Ct. 1022 (1957) ; Mulcahey
v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 77 S. Ct. 1025 (1957).
143. 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952).
144. See section II. D. of this Note.
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and human beings may end up wanderers in strange lands. 145 Unfortunately,
this is still a voice in the wilderness.
C. The Arrest
1. Warrant of Arrest
To prevent illegal restraint for trivial cause "an arrest without warrant
has never been lawful except in those cases where the public security
requires it; and this has only been recognized in felony and in breaches
of the peace committed in presence of the officer. 1 46
A criminal arrest warrant is issued by a judicial authority only upon
the sworn complaint of one who has information showing probable cause
that the accused did in fact commit such crime. 147 Such warrant of arrest
confers the legal authority by virtue of which an arresting officer may
place the accused in his custody and directs the officer, upon apprehension
of the accused, to bring him "before a judicial officer as quickly as possible
so that he may be advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable
cause may be promptly determined.
'1 48
In deportation proceedings the Code of Federal Regulations permits
a district director to issue a warrant of arrest "at the commencement of"
the proceedings or at any later point in the proceedings "whenever, in his
discretion, it appears that the arrest of the [alien] is necessary or
desirable. 1 4 9 Mr. Justice Brennan delineates points of comparison be-
tween the criminal and administrative arrest when, in speaking of a de-
portation arrest, he says:
Here the arrest, while had on what is called a warrant, was made
totally without the intervention of an independent magistrate; it was
made on the authorization of one administrative official to another.
And after the [alien] was taken into custody, there was no obligation
upon the administrative officials who arrested him to take him before
any independent officer, sitting under the conditions of publicity that
characterize our judicial institutions, and justify what had been done."'0
[Emphasis added.]
In a criminal proceeding the complaint is presented to the proper
judicial official and it becomes his duty to determine whether an offense has
been committed and to decide whether there is probable cause to issue an
arrest warrant. This authority exercises a judicial function and must use
judicial discretion in his analysis of the complaint.1 5 1
145. Id. at 600, 72 S. Ct. at 524 (1952).
146. In the Matter of Sarah May, 41 Mich. 299, 1 N.W. 1021, 1024 (1879).
147. 1 VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 114-15 (1961); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 3, 4(a). See Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
148. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(b) (1), Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77
S. Ct. 1356, 1359 (1957).
149. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (a) (1958).
150. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 251, 80 S. Ct. 683, 703 (1960) (dis-
senting opinion).
151. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 78 S. Ct. 1245 (1958).
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Until 1960, "the constitutional validity of . . . [the] administrative
arrest procedure in deportation cases [had] never been directly challenged
in reported litigation." In Abel v. United States, Attorney James Donovan
contended "that the administrative warrant by which [the alien] was
arrested was invalid, because it did not satisfy the requirements for 'war-
rants' under the Fourth Amendment."' 15 2 If in the deportation procedure,
the alien is given no more protection than that the warrant of arrest may
issue at the district director's discretion, the alien is unquestionably denied
constitutional protection. Perhaps an analysis of this administrative arrest
section in its code context will yield an answer to this constitutional
challenge.
Prior to 1956, the alien's arrest initiated all deportation actions.153
The warrant of arrest then had a twofold purpose; first, to open the pro-
ceedings and secondly, to notify the alien of the charge. The rule then
provided that in order that the arrest warrant might issue, prima facie
deportability had to be shown.1 54 This condition precedent would seem to
have compared favorably with the criminal warrant qualification of probable
cause. The 1956 procedure provides that every alien deportation proceeding
be inaugurated by the issuance of an order to show cause ;155 the arrest to
follow if and when decided by the director to be necessary.15 The order
to show cause embodies a compendious factual presentation of evidentiary
matter supporting the charge against the alien.157 The supported charges
set forth in the order to show cause should be sufficient, if true, to make
the alien deportable.' 58 Practically speaking, this means that the director
must make a decision similar to the judgment made by the magistrate;
that is, whether the facts as presented are such as to sanction the issuance
of the order to show cause. However, to allow a director to exercise such
wide discretion raises very serious problems.
2. Issuance of the Warrant
Conceding that the standards which must be met pursuant to the
issuance of the order to show cause are equivalent to the standards by
which a magistrate concludes that an arrest warrant may issue, it never-
theless seems that the spirit of the Fourth Amendment provision for prob-
able cause requires that such conclusion "be drawn by a neutral and de-
tached magistrate [not by an official] . . . engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime."1 59 In deportation proceedings the order
152. 362 U.S. 217, 230, 80 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1960).
153. 8 C.F.R. § 242 (1952).
154. 17 Fed. Reg. 11513 (1952).
155. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (a) (1958).
156. 8 C.F.R. § 242.2 (a) (1958).
157. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (b) (1958).
158. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1 (b) (1958) "The order will require the respondent to
show cause why he should not be deported."
159. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948) applied
the language quoted to a search warrant but the language was later applied to an
arrest warrant in Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486, 78 S. Ct. 1245,
1250 (1958).
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to show cause is issued on the authorization of one administrative officer
to another. The standards exist, but correct standards are rendered nuga-
tory if not applied by one above the law enforcement process-one in a
neutral position who is capable of making a rational determination on the
presented facts and who will not be prejudiced by an overzealous devotion
to duty, a devotion capable of bloating facts and blinding reason. In Abel,
"the warrant of arrest for [the alien] was issued by the . . . District
Director . . . at the same time as he signed an order to show cause."' 60
Such procedure illustrates that the order to show cause can be reduced to
a procedural formality offering no real protection as envisioned by the
framers of the Fourth Amendment when they inserted the probable cause
requirement.
What protection has the alien from unconstitutional apprehension?
If the Immigration and Naturalization Service wants an alien arrested,
perhaps as an excuse for incidental search in a case where there were not
the necessary facts to cause a search warrant to issue, the district director
after reviewing the facts in his discretion, may determine they are sufficient
and issue an order to show cause. Then in his discretion he may decide the
arrest is necessary so he is authorized to issue an arrest warrant. The
order to show cause and the arrest warrant are presented at the same time
and the alien is taken into custody.
3. Post-Arrest Procedures
A criminal arrest warrant directs the arresting officer upon appre-
hension of the accused to bring him before the court so issuing the warrant
or before the nearest committing magistrate without delay in order to
enable the proper judicial authority to acquire jurisdiction of the accused
and hold a preliminary hearing. 6 1 The deportation statute provides that
"[a] ny such alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney
General, and pending such final determination of deportability, . . . be
continued in custody.' 62
The abuse that may be engendered by the lack of post arrest pro-
tections in the deportation process is illustrated by the Abel' 63 case in
which the alien, "upon his arrest, was taken to a local administrative
headquarters and then flown in a special aircraft to a special detention
camp over 1,000 miles away. He was incarcerated in solitary confinement
there. As far as the world knew, he had vanished. '1 4 Any objections
the alien has as to defects in the arrest procedure must be raised preceding
the finding of deportability, (which may often mean being raised while
being detained in custody) since if enough evidence has been gathered to
160. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 232, 80 S. Ct. 683, 693 (1960).
161. Fgo. R. CRIM. P. 5 (a) "An officer making an arrest under a warrant
issued upon a complaint . . .shall take the arrested person without delay before the
nearest available commissioner."
162. § 242, 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1) (1958).
163. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683 (1960).
164. Id. at 251, 80 S. Ct. at 703.
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adequately support a final deportation order, all defects in the arrest are
extinguished.' 65 In such a manner, the alien is protected from apprehension
by what is called a warrant.16
4. Arrest Without a Warrant
In criminal proceedings a police officer may arrest without a warrant
any person who he has reasonable ground for believing has committed a
felony or anyone who, in his vision or presence, has attempted to commit
a felony. 16 7 When an arrest is made without a warrant the arresting officer
is authorized to detain the accused in custody only until such time as a
preliminary hearing may be had. 6
An INS official has authority'6 9 to make an arrest without warrant if
he has reason to believe that an alien, who is in the United States in
violation of the law, is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained
for his arrest or if an alien is attempting to enter the United States illegally
in his presence or view. The court has indicated that a reasonable justifica-
tion must exist for the decision that the alien will escape before an arrest
warrant can be obtained.' 70 Section 1357 (a) (2) provides, ". . . the alien
arrested [without arrest warrant] shall be taken without unnecessary
delay for examination before an officer of the Service having authority to
examine aliens as to their right to enter or remain in the United States."'1 7'
On their face the administrative and criminal procedures for arrest
without warrant seem to be in accord. But, although the procedural pro-
tection is provided by an examination of the alien's right to remain in the
United States by an authorized officer, that authorized officer is neverthe-
less a member of the same law enforcement service that secured the alien's
arrest. The absence of a neutral examiner is as much a drawback in this
area as it is when the arrest is made with a warrant.
The power' 72 of an INS officer to interrogate without warrant any
person believed to be an alien as to his right to remain in the United States
may result in proceedings which, although in literal conformity with the
law, may, nevertheless, be open to challenge because of a particular appli-
cation which such broad statutory language has engendered. A liberal ju-
dicial definition of the term "arrest" will be used to determine if any of
the ramifications of procedure under the interrogation power would parallel
a procedure that would be termed arrest without warrant in a criminal
165. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923).
166. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 251, 80 S. Ct. 683, 703 (1960).
167. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S. Ct. 329 (1959).
168. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1359 (1957).After the arrest without warrant "[tihe next step in the proceeding is to arraign
the arrested person before a judicial officer as quickly as possible so that he maybe advised of his rights and so that the issue of probable cause may be promptly
determined."
169. § 287(a)(2), 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1958).
170. Diogo v. Holland, 243 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1957).
171. § 287(a) (2), 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (2) (1958).
172. § 287(a) (1), 66 Stat. 233 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1) (1958).
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action. Henry v. United States,173 finds an arrest occurring when a police
officer interrupts the freedom of a defendant and restricts his liberty of
movement. Then it becomes "necessary [for the court] to determine
whether at or before that time they [the police] had reasonable cause to
believe that the crime had been committed."'17 4 The question that arises is:
When does an alien under interrogation have his freedom interrupted and
his liberty restricted sufficiently so as to constitute arrest without a warrant?
It seems plausible that a situation could arise where a person, being inter-
rogated in connection with a deportation investigation, would be so detained
as to be considered under arrest without a warrant. If the possibility of such
a situation is accepted it becomes necessary to inquire as to the reasonable-
ness of the cause for such detention.
In criminal proceedings arrests resulting from "tips" from undisclosed
informers are usually made without warrants because under the federal
constitutional provision prohibiting the issuance of warrants without prob-
able cause such a method is insufficient to fulfill this constitutional require-
ment.'1 5 The prior reliability of the informer must first be established or
his information verified before it can be considered a predicate for "trust-
worthy" information to support an arrest without warrantY76 By compar-
ison, the deportation regulations stipulate that the service shall "investi-
gate the case of every person believed to be subject to arrest and deporta-
tion. ' ' 177 "[I]nvestigations are ordered in response to reports by public
officials, notably those in charge of jails and public welfare institutions and
also in response to 'tips' often motivated by spite or revenge which come
from members of the general public.' 78 If the deportation investigation,
based upon such "tips", progresses to the interrogation stage, serious con-
stitutional questions could be raised by a procedure so resembling an
arrest without a warrant yet not justified even by deportation regulations
providing for such an arrest.
"Under our system suspicion is not enough for an officer to lay hands
on a citizen. It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the
guilty sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest.' 7 9
Although Mr. Justice Douglas here speaks only of the protection given the
citizen, the Fourth Amendment extends its protection to the rights of the
people; the latter term embracing citizens and aliens alike.
173. 361 U.S. 98, 80 S. Ct. 168, (1959).
174. Id. at 103, 80 S. Ct. at 171.
175. Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
176. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S. Ct. 623 (1957).
177. 17 Fed. Reg. 11512 (1952).
178. Developments in the Law-Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REv.
643, 691 (1953), citing VAN VLrCK, THe ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL or ALIENS 92-95(1932) ; 2 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT REPORTS
52 (1931).
179. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104, 80 S. Ct. 168, 172 (1959).
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D. Search and Seizure
1. Incident to Administrative Arrest
The common law belief that the use of search warrants "was confined
to cases of public prosecutions, instituted and pursued for the suppression
of crime or the detection and punishment of criminals"180 has carried over
to the present day and served as basis for the argument that since deporta-
tion proceedings have been held to be civil in nature,"" the arrest of an
alien pursuant to an administrative arrest warrant "did not confer upon
the arresting officers the right to search the hotel room in which the arrest
was made."'1 82 The Court of Appeals in United States v. Abel,' 83 answered
the argument by showing that the use of search warrants was limited to
criminal proceedings at common law because civil suits were considered
to concern only suits wherein a private party would prosecute a personal
claim. "Deportation obviously is not a civil cause involving only the rights
of one individual as against another. Such a proceeding is initiated in the
interests of the United States and for the protection of its citizens.' 18 4
Therefore the label civil or administrative doesn't defeat the right of search
and seizure incident either to a search warrant or to an administrative
arrest. 85
2. Practical Necessity of Search and Seizure in Administrative Arrest
In criminal proceedings search and seizure is necessary to protect the
arresting officer and to deprive the prisoner of potential means of escape;
also to avoid the destruction of evidence and to seize instrumentalities by
which the crime was committed. 8 6 In deportation proceedings the search
for a weapon is justified since an administrative officer in making an arrest
has as much need for protecting himself and preventing the prisoner from
escaping as does a policeman arresting for a crime.187 Materials that prove
deportability18 may be searched for and seized with equal reasonableness
180. Robinson v. Richardson, 13 Mass. (13 Gray) 454, 456 (1859), quoted in
United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 493 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct.
683 (1960).
181. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952).
182. United States v. Abel, 258 F.2d 485, 493 (2d Cir. 1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 217,
80 S. Ct. 683 (1960).
183. Ibid. The lower court in United States v. Abel, 155 F. Supp. 8, 11 (E.D.N.Y.
1957) had stated this challenge was "a matter of first impression."
184. United States v. Abel, 155 F. Supp. 8, 10 (E.D.N.Y. 1957), afr'd, 258 F.2d
485 (1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 217, 80 S. Ct. 683 (1960).
185. We will assume for the purpose of this discussion that the administrative
arrest procedure is constitutional. But see, section III. C. of this Note.
186. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 1103 (1947),
held that during a search incident to a valid arrest "objects which may validly be
seized [include] the instrumentalities and means by which a crime is committed, thefruits of the crime, such as stolen property, weapons by which the escape of the
person arrested might be effected, and property the possession of which is a crime."
187. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 251, 80 S. Ct. 683, 703 (1960) (dis-
senting opinion).
188. Vlisidis v. Holland, 245 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1957) (passports and crewmen's
landing permits); Williams v. Mulcahey, 250 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 946 (1958) (official registries of entry).
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because the need for proof is as great in administrative as in criminal pro-
cedure since deportation can be accomplished only after a hearing at which
deportability is established upon adequate evidence.18 9
To decide there are some things justifiably seizable by the authorities
in both criminal and civil action pursuant to arrest is to implicitly deter-
mine that there are other things not justifiably seizable. This in turn
prompts the question: How are persons (citizens and aliens) protected from
unjust searches and resulting seizures?
3. The Safeguards Against Illegal Search and Seizure
A search without a search warrant incident to an arrest is dependent
for its validity upon a valid arrest.190 A search may not be exploratory'9 1
nor may merely evidentiary matter be seized. 192 The Fourth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States provides for the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures.
In criminal proceedings the right of the people to be secure from
unreasonable search and seizure was thus boldly pronounced but its denial
was left almost 193 totally devoid of sanction by the courts of the time which
continued to apply the common law rule that the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of the procedure by which it was obtained.
If the right was to have any meaning at all, the courts decided, its abuse
would have to be met with strong sanctions. 194 Judge Learned Hand so
well expressed the reason for the sanction which was adopted when he
wrote:
Exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the Constitutional
privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer.
Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that wrong be sup-
pressed. 195
189. Ocon v. Del Guercio, 237 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1956).
190. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60, 70 S. Ct. 430, 432 (1950).
191. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S. Ct. 153 (1931)
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S. Ct. 420 (1932).
192. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 154, 67 S. Ct. 1098, 1103 (1947). "This
court has frequently recognized [that] merely evidentiary materials . . . may not be
seized either under the authority of a search warrant or during the course of a search
incident to arrest .. "
193. The wronged person's only remedy was a civil action for damages against
the wrongdoer. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945).
194. An early attempt to set up an exclusion rule is evidenced in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524 (1886), where it was held that an order of the
court requiring the claimant of goods to produce an invoice in court to be offered as
evidence against him was an unconstitutional exercise of authority and its admission
as evidence was declared unconstitutional.
195. United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d 497, 499 (2d Cir. 1945).
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The sanction reached full application in all courts, federal 9 6 and state,
when in 1961, Mr. Justice Clark, speaking for the court in Mapp v. Ohio,197
held that evidence acquired by a search and seizure in violation of the
Constitution is inadmissible in a state court. In criminal proceedings the
question, whether it is reasonable to search and seize without procuring
a search warrant, is decided by the arresting officers. It has been considered
"a sufficient precaution that law officers must justify their conduct before
courts which have always been, and must be, jealous of the individual's
right of privacy within the broad sweep of the Fourth Amendment.
'1 9 8
"The Fourth Amendment and its companion, the exclusionary rule, protect
the individual's right of privacy by creating a barrier between the citizen
and the police which can be surmounted only by certain prescribed
methods."' 199
What barrier exists to protect the alien's right of privacy from the im-
migration officer? It is often stated as a general proposition that the rules
of evidence do not control in deportation proceedings since they are con-
sidered actions of a civil nature.2 0 0 The Code20 ' asks only that the evidence
be reasonable, substantial, and probative, which would seem to give much
leeway as to just what type evidence will be regarded as competent by the
court on review. To date there has been no case in which the Supreme
Court has passed directly on the admissibility of evidence obtained through
illegal search and seizure incident to an administrative arrest. In the few
cases20 2 in which the charge of illegal seizure has arisen, the fact situations
presented seem to justify the courts overruling the contention of illegal
search and seizure as not being adequately substantiated.
In deportation proceedings "the general rule is that defects in the
arrest or other preliminary proceedings [which would include the search]
are extinguished if the final deportation order is adequately supported.'
'20 3
In a judicial review of any administrative hearing in which the general rule
was applied, any hope of an alien to raise the question of unlawful search
and seizure on judicial review would be negated by the court's strict ad-
herence to the language in Ocon v. Del Guercio,20 4 which held, "[iun
determining whether substantial evidence exists to support an order of
deportation, a court should not substitute its judgment for that of the
196. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914) held that the
Fourth Amendment prevented the use of illegally seized evidence in a federal prose-
cution.
197. 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).
198. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66, 70 S. Ct. 430, 435 (1950).
199. Comment, 7 VILL. L. REv. 407-08 (1962).
200. Ex parte Zavala, 298 Fed. 544 (N.D. Tex. 1924) held that an officer sitting
at a deportation hearing is not bound by any rules of criminal procedure nor is he
bound by the rules of evidence as applied by the courts.
201. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (4) (1958).
202. Tsimounis v. Holland, 228 F.2d 907 (3d Cir. 1956) ; Diogo v. Holland, 243
F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1957).
203. GORDON & ROSENFIELD, § 8.12 (b) citing United States cx rel. Bilokumsky
v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923). "Irregularities on the part of tile govern-
ment official prior to, or in connection with, the arrest would not necessarily invalidate
later proceedings." Id. at 158, 44 S. Ct. at 57.
204. Ocon v. Del Guercio, 237 F.2d 177, 180 (1956).
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immigration authorities." Approaching the problem analytically, it plainly
appears that illegal search and seizure is, as one court has put it:
[U]nreasonable and contrary to the spirit [of the Fourth Amend-
ment] ; and [objects], procured in that way, cannot be used in evidence
against [the alien] from whom they are procured without violating
the protection afforded by the [Fourth Amendment] to all persons in
this country. It has been said that the manner of obtaining such evi-
dence, whether by force or fraud, does not affect its admissibility; but
these constitutional safeguards would be deprived of a large part of
their value if they could be invoked only for preventing the obtaining
of such evidence, and not for protection against its use.20 5 [Emphasis
added.]
Mr. Justice Brandeis20 6 has stated by way of dictum, "[i]t may be
assumed that evidence obtained by the [Immigration and Naturalization
Service] through an illegal search and seizure cannot be made the basis
of a finding in deportation proceedings." In 1923, this dictum erected the
skeleton of a protective barrier to guard aliens' privacy; in 1963, the bones
still remain bare. Given the proper case it is felt that the Supreme Court
should flesh this skeleton with a hide of mail, providing an aegis to protect
the resident alien's constitutionally given right to privacy.
E. Bail
The provisions for bail in a criminal proceeding under the federal
system are relatively clear, uncomplicated and virtually a matter of right
for the accused.20 7 The citizen arrested for a non-capital offense will be
admitted to bail when adequate assurance is given that he will stand trial
and submit to sentence if found guilty.208
The alien who is arrested and charged with a deportable offense is
confronted with a discretionary bail system involving elaborate appeals and
the necessity of satisfying certain conditions precedent. While the alien
is being detained pending a determination of his deportability, it is within
the discretion of the Attorney General either to continue custody or to
release him on bond or parole. 20 9 Usually the alien will be released on bond
or parole, provided he agrees to appear for his hearing, deportation (if
ordered) or detention (if required) .210 If the alien refuses to comply with
these conditions, the Attorney General may continue custody. 2 11 The latter
procedure is employed where he deems the alien's release prejudicial to
205. United States v. Wong Quong Wong, 94 Fed. 832, 833-34 (D. Vt. 1899).
206. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 155, 44 S. Ct. 54,
56 (1923).
207. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46 (a) (1). Since deportation is a federal matter and
unquestionably a non-capital offense, we will not concern ourselves with bail under
capital offenses and under state law. It is sufficient to say that bail is virtually un-
denied in all cases except capital cases where proof of guilt is evident.
208. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 1 (1951).
209. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1958).
210. GORDON & ROSENPIELD, § 5.4d.
211. Ibid.
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the interests of national security212 which is shown when by his release
the alien "would have opportunities to hurt the United States during the
pendency of deportation proceedings. '213 Although the Attorney General's
discretion under the Immigration Act214 is very broad it is subject to
judicial review 215 and his decision will not be overturned unless the alien
can clearly show it to be without reasonable foundation.2 16 The courts will
generally uphold the discretion as exercised where it appears that the con-
ditions of the bond or parole reasonably relate to the defense of national
security or where they are imposed in the legitimate belief that otherwise
the alien will flee. Thus a denial of bond was upheld where the alien was
engaged in recent Communist activity, 217 where the surety was unreliable 218
or where there was a valid suspicion that the alien would flee. 219 But,
denial of bail when the alien was not a recent Communist, 220 or refusal of
the alien to answer questions about Communist activity at a Congressional
hearing2 21 or because the surety was a member of a subversive organization
have been held to be an abuse of discretion.222 It was likewise an abuse of
discretion to deny bail unless the alien agreed to refrain from working for
a Communist newspaper. 223
The contrast is brought into sharper focus by the following compar-
ison. If two active Communists, one an alien and the other a citizen are
arrested for violation of the Immigration Act 224 and criminal syndicalism 2 25
respectively, the citizen will have the right to bail and the alien is given the
Attorney General's discretion safeguarded by a series of costly appeals and
delays. Yet the violations arise out of similar fact situations,226 the prin-
212. United States v. Shaughnessy, 194 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1952).
213. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538, 72 S. Ct. 525, 533 (1952), presumably
through some type of underground activity.
214. Supra note 207.
215. Yanish v. Barber, 73 S. Ct. 1105, 1108 (1953).
216. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952). Although decided
prior to the passage of the 1952 Act, the decisions subsequent to Carlson have said
that the 1952 Act did not change the existing standard of review. United States v.
Esperdy, 202 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1953).
217. Supra note 210.
218. United States v. Flynn, 190 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1951) (Surety disregarded
his obligation to produce the defendants).
219. United States v. Shaughnessy, 194 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1952).
220. United States v. Esperdy, 108 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (No Corn-
munist activity within the past several years).
221. United States v. Shaughnessy, 212 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1954).
222. United States ex rcl. Bittelman v. District Director, 99 F. Supp. 306
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
223. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 72 S. Ct. 525 (1952).
224. Immigration and Nationality Act § 241 (a) (6) (B), 66 Stat. 205 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (6) (B) (1958).
225. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-01 (1956) ; N. J. STAT. AN. tit. 2A,
§ 147-48 (1953) ; N. Y. PENAL LAW § 161 (1944).
226. Compare the Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 278 which makes
aliens who ". . . advocate or teach, or are members of or affiliated with any organi-
zation that advocates or teaches opposition to all organized government . . ." subject
to deportation with the following state statutes defining the same acts as criminal:
"... advocating, teaching, or aiding and abetting unlawful acts of force and violence
or unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in industrial
ownership or control, or effecting any political change .... ." CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11400 (1956); "Any person who in public or private speech, writing, printing or
NOTE
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cipals have similar backgrounds and the only meaningful difference is the
penalty. 227 The alien is in extremely serious difficulty in facing deportation
whereas his citizen comrade is likely to be penalized much less severely.
That the resemblance between the offenses should be inversely proportionate
to the bail provisions especially in view of the high stakes for the alien is
illogical and grossly unjust. When bail is denied to the alien it is usually
on the grounds that he is a security risk.228 It is evident that the citizen
in the above example is no less a risk. Government agents can just as
readily keep an alien under surveillance as they can a citizen.
While there are other procedural disparities between criminal and
deportation proceedings which can be justified, however limply, on the
"national security" reasoning it is clear that the alien poses no greater
danger than his citizen counterpart. It is this type of analogy that argues
most strenuously toward uniformity of bail provisions which, ironically,
would raise the alien to the status of a criminal.
F. Jurisdiction
1. Of the Tribunal
The Criminal Code of the United States229 provides that the district
courts "shall have original jurisdiction . . .of all offenses against the laws
of the United States." The Immigration and Nationality Service takes
jurisdiction of deportation proceedings pursuant to a regulation issued
under the authority of the Attorney General who is charged with the ad-
ministration of the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 30
There is no specific provision that an alien has the right to have the
hearing at any forum convenient to him. Theoretically, a California alien
could be served into a New York hearing. However, in practice, virtually
all hearings are held at the immigration station where the alien requests
they be held for his convenience. Courts consider that conducting a hearing
at any other situs is within the discretion of the hearing inspectors, and
will uphold a challenge of unfairness if such discretion is abused.231
otherwise advocates the subversion or destruction by force of any and all government
.... "N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 148-7 (1953) ; anyone who ". . . advocates, advises
or teaches the duty necessity or propriety of overthrowing or overturning organized
government by force or violence .... N. Y. PENAL LAW § 161 (1944). (Emphasis
added.)
227. Compare the extreme penalty of deportation and all of its tragic overtones
with the penalties under the state criminal syndicalism statutes. On the latter point
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoD § 11401 (1956) ". . . imprisonment in the state prison
not less than one nor more than 14 years; . N.. " .J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A § 148-7 (1953)
".. . a fine of not more than $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 15 years
or both;...." N. Y. PENAL LAW § 161 (1944) ". . . by imprisonment for not more than
ten years or by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars, or both." It should
be noted that parole is always available as relief to the criminal; there is no similar
provision for an alien.
228. The other reason bail is denied the alien is the suspicion that he might flee,
but this is also proper ground for denial of bail to a citizen.
229. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1951).
230. 8 C.F.R. § 242.1.
231. 8 C.F.R. § 242(1)(c) (1958).
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2. Service of Process
Basically, the service of process requirements are similar for the citizen
in a criminal proceeding and an alien in a deportation proceeding. In the
criminal proceeding the warrant is executed by the arrest of the defendant.
It is not mandatory that the officer have the warrant at the time of the
arrest, but upon request he shall show the warrant to the defendant as
soon as possible.2 3 2 Upon request of the attorney for the government a
summons instead of a warrant shall issue.233  This summons must be
served upon a defendant by delivering a copy to him personally, or by
leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person
of suitable age and discretion then residing therein or by mailing it to the
defendant's last known address.23 4 It is significant that the service of a
summons in criminal cases is substantially similar to that in civil cases.-
3
Provisions are set forth that the officer executing the warrant must make
a return of it, and any unexecuted warrant must be returned to the United
States Commissioner by whom it was issued and must be cancelled by
him. 23 0
For an alien, the proceedings are commenced by an order to show
cause. The Service officer has the duty to serve this, and may do so by
either of the following methods: (1) handing the order to show cause to
the alien or leaving it at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age or discretion then residing therein; (2) mailing
the order to show cause to the alien at his last known address by certified
or registered mail, return receipt requested. The office return receipt or the
certificate of the officer attesting to delivery constitutes proof of service.23 7
It can be seen that due to the civil nature of service of process for the
criminal citizen, the protections afforded to the alien in this respect equate
those of the citizen.
G. Notice
The warrant or summons issued to the citizen shall describe the offense
charged in the complaint.23 8 It is essential that the complaint set forth
with particularity facts alleged to constitute a crime.23 9 Under the 1952
232. United States v. McCandless, 61 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1932). Alien requested
that hearing be held at Gloucester, N. J. Inspectors chose to hold hearing at Beth-
lehem, Pa. The court held there was no abuse of discretion because all of the wit-
nesses lived in the vicinity of Bethlehem. See also cases holding that hearings at
prisons where aliens were serving sentences were not abuses of discretion. United
States v. Reimer, 103 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1939) ; United States v. Curran, 12 F.2d 394
(2d Cir. 1926); United States v. Reimer, 23 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1938), off' d
97 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1938).
233. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (c) (3).
234. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (a).
235. Supra note 230.
236. 4 BARRON, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1855 at n. 15 (1951). See
FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (d) (1).
237. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.
238. FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (b) (1).
239. United States v. Wilentz, 25 F.R.D. 492, (D. N. J. 1960), aff'd, 280 F.2d
422 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 875, 81 S. Ct. 120.
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Act, the alien is entitled to notice, reasonable under the circumstances, of
the nature of the charges against him and of the time and place at which
the proceedings will be held.2 40 It is suggested that such a statement ob-
viously embodies an essential element of procedural due process. 241 Once
a warrant of arrest is served upon an alien which gives him notice that
he -will be afforded a hearing on the charges against him, such notice is
sufficient to comply with the requirements of due process. 2 42 Since 1956,
the proceeding has been inaugurated by service of an order to show cause,
which delinates with greater particularity the factual basis of the charges.243
It has been suggested, since more than notice of generalized charges in the
warrant of arrest is required, the modern procedure is comparable to an
indictment in a criminal case or a complaint in a civil case.244
H. Presence
The normal method of proceeding in all criminal cases in the district
courts, whether felony or misdemeanor, will be in the presence of the
defendant. 245 Specifically, the Rule is that "[t]he defendant shall be present
at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of
the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence..
.-246 The Rule adds that, except in capital cases, the defendant may not
defeat the proceedings by voluntarily absenting himself after the trial has
commenced in his presence. 247 It is suggested that there is no violation of
due process in imputing to a defendant, a valid waiver of his privilege to
be present and to confront the witnesses, if he voluntarily absents himself
after his trial has commenced.
248
In the case of an alien, the 1952 Act provides that he shall have rea-
sonable opportuniity to be present. If any alien has been given a reasonable
opportunity to be present and without reasonable cause fails or refuses to
attend or remain in attendance at such proceeding, the special inquiry
240. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (1958).
241. GORDON & RosENFIELD, § 56a.
242. United States v. Esperdy, 280 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960).
243. GORDON & RoSENFILD, § 56.
244. Ibid.
245. Barron, supra note 234, at § 2451.
246. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43. The advisory committee for the drafting of the rules
noted that the rule setting forth the necessity of the defendant's presence at arraign-
ment and trial is a restatement of existing law. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442,
445, 32 S. Ct. 250, 252 (1911). Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 136
(1892). This principle does not apply to hearings on motions made prior to or after
trial. United States v. Lynch, 132 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1942).
247. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43, Barron, supra note 234 § 2451. As he points out, the
advisory committee for the Rules brought out that this was also a restatement of
existing case law. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 455, 32 S. Ct. 250, 252 (1911) ;
United States v. Noble, 294 Fed. 689 (D Mont. 1923), aff'd, 300 Fed. 689 (9th Cir.
1924); United States v. Barracota, 45 F. Supp. 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); United States
v. Vassalo, 52 F.2d 699 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
248. Barron, supra note 234 § 2451. This rule providing that the accused's voluntary
absence, after trial has been commenced in his presence for an offense not punishable
by death, shall not prevent continuing the trial to and including rendition of verdict,
approves as due process of law the inference of waiver from voluntary absence.
State v. Utecht, 228 Minn. 44, 36 N.W.2d 126 (1949).
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officer may proceed to a determination as if the alien were present.2 49 In
two relatively recent cases before the Board of Immigration appeals, orders
of deportation were made notwithstanding the fact that the alien never
was present.2 50 In Matter of S., 25'1 the "aliens" argued that as naturalized
citizens, the Immigration and Nationalization Service does not have juris-
diction to proceed against them, since to take away such citizenship, the
government must go through certain statutory procedures. The government
alleged that the "aliens" lost their United States nationality by operation
of law. The Board held that "[the aliens] cannot be permitted to defeat
the clear mandate of sections 242 and 287 (b) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act by refusing to attend a proceeding . . . on the ground that
there has not been a judicial revocation of their citizenship and, therefore,
no jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act. ' 252 In Matter
of P.C.,253 notice of the hearing was served twice, and the alien failing
to appear, the deportation hearing was conducted in his absence, and the
deportation order granted. In both cases, the Board merely stated the
statutory provision, and recognizing that notice had been served upon the
aliens, proceeded without them. Moreover, situations arise where the alien
was present initially at the hearing, but it was carried to completion in his
absence. Some courts hold that the examination of witnesses in the absence
of both the alien and his counsel without notice to either violates the Immi-
gration Acts, and does not rise to the standards of due process of law to
which the alien, as well as all other persons in the United States is en-
titled. 254 Such a view at least accords with the proposition that the alien
must have fair notice before action will be taken without his presence. But,
the power to proceed in the absence of the alien is an extreme power, and
its very existence seems to contradict considerations of fairness. "The
obvious question here is what constitutes 'reasonable opportunity' to attend
and 'reasonable cause' for absence. ' 55 The determination of reasonableness
directly affects not only the power to proceed with a hearing, but it may
have a vital effect upon the ultimate issue, deportability. An alien may be
quite able to refute the substantive charge against him, but be deprived of
an /opportunity to do so by an erroneous determination of "reasonable-
ness."
2 5 6
249. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).
250. Matter of P.C., 8 I. & N. Dec. 670-(1960); Matter of S., 7 I. & N. Dec.
529 (1957). See also Weinbrand v. Prentis, 4 F.2d 778 (6th Cir. 1925).
251. 7 I. & N. Dec. 529 (1957).
252. Id. at 531.
253. 8I. & N. Dec. 670 (1960).
254. Ex parte Bunji Une, 41 F.2d 239 (S.D. Cal. 1930) ; see also United States
v. Sibray, 178 Fed. 150 (W.D. Pa. 1910), rev'd on other grounds, 185 Fed. 401 (3d
Cir. 1911).
255. Note, Deportation and Due Process, 5 STAN. L. R, v. 722, 729 (1953).
256. Ibid.
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I. Impartiality of the Judicial Officer
"Judges are disqualified from sitting in cases in which they have a
personal interest, or in which they have acted as counsel, or in which they
have a relationship to the parties or an interest in the subject matter. '25 7
Generally, a judge is disqualified from a trial in which he has any
bias or prejudice, but the courts try to avoid any frivolous attacks on the
judiciary, 258 and any such showing of bias or prejudice may be quite
difficult to prove. Also, if the trial judge has any bias or prejudice, a
substantial interest in the case, or has been of counsel, he is expected to
disqualify himself.2 9 But it has been held that for section 455 to come into
operation, it is necessary that the trial judge have knowledge that he comes
within the statute.26 0 No specific cases were found that stated a trial was
conducted prejudicially because the judge was both the judge and prose-
cutor, but it seems such commingling of the two functions would necessarily
violate due process.
For a deportation proceeding, Congress has passed a special statute
which approves the commingling of the judge and prosecutor. This express
congressional approval is found in section 1252(b), which authorizes a
special inquiry officer to administer oaths, present and receive evidence,
interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses, and make
determinations, including orders of deportation.2 61 But this section will not
permit the inquiry officer to conduct the hearing if he participated in the
investigative functions of the hearing.2 62
257. MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 174, 231. See also, United States
v. Foster, 81 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), mandamus denied sub noma. Foster v.
Medina, 170 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909, 69 S. Ct. 412 (1949).
258. United States v. Valenti, 120 F. Supp. 80, 83 (D.N.J. 1954), was a case
where the defendant filed an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1949), alleging bias
and prejudice on the part of the trial judge. The court stated, "While the statutory
provision of Congress providing for the recusation or disqualification of a trial judge
by the filing of an affidavit of bias or prejudice is a remedial measure having for its
purpose assurance to litigants of a fair and impartial trial before a judge of the
United States, it has been well established that the statute is to be given the utmost
strict construction in order to safeguard the judiciary from frivolous attacks upon
its dignity and integrity, and to avoid interruption of its ordinary and proper function-
ing." See also Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 41 S. Ct. 230 (1921).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1949): "Any justice or judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of
counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein."
260. Adams v. United States, 302 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1962). The case involved
a situation where the judge was the United States Attorney for the prosecution of
the defendant in a prior liquor case, and that in the present perjury case, the judge
was allegedly disqualified because he had either "i substantial interest" or it was a
case in which the judge "has been of counsel." The court said, "Although it is
doubtless true that the term 'substantial interest' normally refers to a pecuniary or
beneficial interest of some kind, we construe the language broadly enough to compre-
hend the interest that any lawyer has in pushing his case to a successful conclusion.
However, for this 'interest' to arise, there must, as a minimum, be knowledge on
behalf of the judge that the case is one that fits within the category." 302 F.2d at
310. (Emphasis added.)
261. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1958).
262. Ibid. ". . . no special inquiry officer shall conduct a proceeding in any
case under this section in which he shall have participated in investigative functions
or in which he shall have participated (except as provided in this subsection) in
prosecuting functions .... (Emphasis added.)
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When the problem faced the Supreme Court in Marcello v. Bonds, 263
the Court stated the Administrative Procedure Act did not apply when
Congress has pre-empted that particular area. The Court interpreted the
legislative intent as expressed in the Immigration Act's detailed coverage
of hearing provisions to mean "that Congress was setting up a specialized
administrative procedure applicable to deportation hearings, drawing liber-
ally on the analogous provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act and
adopting them to the particular needs of the deportation process. '2 4 The
Court concluded that the Administrative Procedure Act was intended only
as a model for Congress, and in view of the mandatory language of Con-
gress that the procedure set out in the act be the "sole and exclusive pro-
cedure for determining the deportability of an alien,' 2 5 that the Immigra-
tion Act superseded the hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure
Act. In the light of the Marcello holding, it has been virtually impossible to
convince a court that the commingling of the judge-prosecutor violates
due process and negates a fair hearing.266 Even though the alien might be
confronted with a single judge-prosecutor, he might be able to have the
hearing nullified if he can show that the official was either biased or prej-
udiced in his particular case. 267 Since the Marcello decision and the con-
gressional statute expressly authorizing a single judicial officer, the argu-
ment that due process is violated by vesting such power within one person,
will unhappily fall upon deaf judicial ears despite the very fertile grounds
for abuse.
J. Right to Counsel
In the deportation proceeding, the question of an alien's right to counsel
becomes important in ascertaining if he has been afforded a "fair hearing" as
required by due process. The Sixth Amendment states that "In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." (Emphasis added.) As is manifest,
the Sixth Amendment commands "Assistance of Counsel" in criminal pro-
ceedings, but does an alien have the same constitutional rights given the
accused in a criminal prosecution? To answer this question, the various
steps in an alien deportation proceeding, and in a civilian criminal prose-
cution, where the assistance of counsel is desirable or necessary, are set
out as a means of determining the alien's rights in this area.
263. 349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955).
264. Id. at 308, 75 S. Ct. at 761.
265. Id. at 309, 75 S. Ct. at 761.
266. See Suarez-Seja v. Landon, 237 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1956); Marcello v.
Ahrens, 212 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954), aff'd, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955);
Farquharson v. Landon, 217 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1954) ; United States v. Shaughnessy,
197 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1952).
267. United States v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 74 S. Ct. 499 (1954) ; Acosta
v. Landon, 125 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954). See generally GORDON & ROSENFIELD,
§ 8.12b; Note, The Special Inquiry Officer in Deportation Proceedings, 42 VA. L.
REv. 803 (1956).
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1. At Arrest
After an arrest, a considerable time lapse can occur between apprehen-
sion and formal arraignment. In an attempt to meet the problem, the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have specified in Rules 5(a) and
5 (b) a procedural format to be followed by the authorities after an arrest.
Even in spite of Rule 5 (a), which requires that an arrested person be pre-
sented before the Commissioner "without unnecessary delay", there are
time lapses.268
While a time lapse may occur between the arrest and the arraignment,
Rule 5(a) affords some protection to a defendant in a criminal proceeding,
in that certain incriminating evidence acquired during this interim may not
be received into evidence. In Mallory v. United States,2 16 the Supreme
Court sketched the format to be used in initiating a federal prosecution.
They stated the familiar requirements that an arrest be made with probable
cause and not on mere suspicion; the accused should be presented for ar-
raignment "as quickly as possible" after arrest, and that the judicial officer
must appraise him of his rights. The accused may be "booked" at police
headquarters, but may not be detained there to elicit damaging statements
to support the arrest.27 0 Elsewhere in their opinion, the Court said:
. . . police detention of defendants beyond the time when a
committing magistrate was readily accessible constituted "wilful dis-
obedience of law." In order adequately to enforce the congressional
requirement of prompt arraignment, it was deemed necessary to render
inadmissible incriminating statements elicited from defendants during
a period of unlawful detention.27 1
Thus, there is afforded some protection to a citizen, by the "unnecessary
delay" rule, but the problem of what is a reasonable time to present the
arrested person before the Commissioner is open to conjecture. In United
States v. Skeeters,272 the court declared the prompt taking of a detained
person before a Commissioner to be "as important a duty as is the prompt
investigation of crime. '2 73 Citing Upshaw v. United States,2 7 4 the Skeeters
court continued, "... 'a confession is inadmissible if made during illegal de-
tention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing
268. See MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 174 (1959). See also, Beaney,
Right To Counsel Before Arraignment, 45 MINN. L. REv. 771, 775-76 (1961).
It is true that there is no federal rule specifically requiring access to counsel, and
it is not until the appearance before a commissioner that the defendant must be
advised of his right to retain counsel and have reasonable opportunity to consult
him. But it would be difficult to argue that the failure to take an arrested person
before a commissioner "without unnecessary delay" should be given greater
significance than refusal to afford the defendant access to counsel. (Emphasis
added.)
269. 354 U.S. 449, 77 S. Ct. 1356 (1957).
270. Interpreting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322, 343-44, 63 S. Ct. 608,
614 (1943).
271. 354 U.S. 449, 453, 77 S. Ct. 1356, 1358-59 (1957).
272. 122 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
273. Id. at 57.
274. 335 U.S. 410, 69 S. Ct. 170 (1948).
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magistrate, whether or not the confession is the result of torture, physical
or psychological.' "275 In Skeeters the court indicated that the prisoner
should have been taken to the Commissioner by late Monday afternoon,
instead of Tuesday, the day the authorities presented him for arraignment.2 7
Once the accused is presented before the Commissioner for arraign-
ment, Rule 5(b) operates. That rule requires, inter alia, that he inform
the defendant of his right to retain counsel and to afford defendant reason-
able time and opportunity to consult counsel.2 77 The accused has only the
right to retain counsel; no provision is made for assignment of counsel if
he is unable to afford counsel at this point. It is quite possible that assign-
ment of counsel at this step will be granted in the near future. 278
For the alien, there are two applicable statutes which roughly corre-
spond to the criminally accused's Sixth Amendment protections.2 79 The Im-
migration and Nationality Act does not appear to specifically recognize the
right to representation of counsel at an interrogation, prior to the deporta-
tion hearing,2S° But, it is possible that if an interrogation were unduly pro-
longed prior to the alien's appearance before an Immigration Service offi-
cial, the question of fairness in the proceedings might come into question.
In Landon v. Clark,281 respondent in an interview admitted she had mis-
represented her identity, marital status, and last place of residence in her
application for a visa to the United States. When she objected to lack of
counsel at this preliminary interview, the court stated, "That appellee was
not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing was immaterial,
since she was so represented at subsequent hearings. . . . The record on
appeal does not substantiate the charge of unfairness made by the appel-
lee."'282 Another factor for consideration in this area is that the Adminis-
275. 122 F. Supp. 52, 57 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
276. See also United States v. Bradford, 122 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
277. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b). See also MORELAND, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
174 (1959) ; BARRON, 4 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 77 (1951).
278. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure for the United States District Courts, 83 S. Ct. (1963).
Rule 5(b): "The commissioner shall inform the defendant of the complaint
against him, of his right to retain counsel, of his right to request the assignment
of counsel, and of his right to have a preliminary examination. (Emphasis indi-
cates new matter.)
Advisory Committee's Note: This amendment obligates the commissioner to
inform the defendant of his right to request the assignment of counsel. The
amendment to Rule 44 gives a defendant unable to obtain counsel the right to
have counsel appointed within a reasonable time after he requests such appointment.
279. "In any exclusion or deportation proceedings before a special inquiry officer
and in any appeal proceedings before the Attorney General from any such exclusion
or deportation proceedings, the person concerned shall have the privilege of being
represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to
practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose." 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (1958).
(2) "[tlhe alien shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense
to the Government) by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings,
as he shall choose." 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (2) (1958).
280. GORDON & ROSENIIELD, § 5.2b.
281. 239 F.2d 631 (1st Cir. 1956).
282. Id. at 636.
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trative Procedure Act possibly gives a person a right to demand a right
of representation when his appearance is compelled.283
Bearing in mind that in a criminal proceeding, evidence obtained at
an interrogation may not be admissible at trial, it is possible that informa-
tion obtained at the deportation interrogation may be used at the hearing,
especially if the alien had counsel at later proceedings. In United States
v. Neeley,284 the court stated, "This objection, in substance, is that, under
examination before the inspection officer, at first she had no counsel. Such
an examination is within the authority of the statute, and it is not denied
that at subsequent stages of the proceedings and before the hearing was
closed or the orders were made she had the assistance and advice of
counsel."
285
Clearly the alien does not have the same protections as the accused
in a criminal proceeding under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The limited protection afforded the alien can be circumvented at the whim
of the Immigration Service, unless checked by a judiciary that has only
the highest regard for the "vital interests involved and of the need for
assuring the fullest protection of basic human rights.' '2 6
Some authority subscribes to the view that the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment comes into play at some point prior to the deporta-
tion hearing, since that "clause usually has been regarded as encompassing
the right to be represented by counsel, '287 but the precise extent to which
this thinking can be translated into any additional protection is unpre-
dictable because in the absence of a specific rule, it is contingent upon the
attitude of the particular immigration official. 288
2. At Preliminary Hearing
As previously noted, when a prisoner is presented before a commis-
sioner for arraignment, he must be informed of his right to counsel.28 9
Also, the commissioner must "allow the defendant reasonable time and
opportunity to consult counsel" under Rule 5(b). The only limitation to a
prisoner's rights under Rule 5(b) is that he has no right to have counsel
assigned at this preliminary hearing before the commissioner.2 0 However,
283. Supra note 280. See also, 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1947),
which states, "Any person compelled to appear in person before any agency or repre-
sentative thereof shall be accorded the right to be accompanied, represented, and
advised by counsel or, if permitted by the agency, by other qualified representative.
Every party shall be accorded the right to appear in person or by or with counsel or
other duly qualified representative in any agency proceeding."
284. 202 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997, 73 S. Ct. 1139 (1953).
285. 202 F. 2d at 223. See also, Gordon, Right to Counsel in Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 45 MINN. L. RFv. 875, 880 (1961).
286. Gordon, supra note 285, at 876.
287. Ibid.
288. Gordon, supra note 285, at 882-83.
289. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(b).
290. BARRON, supra note 277, at § 1873. Cf. United States v. McNair, 18 F.R.D.
417, 420 (D.D.C. 1955), in which the court stated, ". . . it must be borne in mind
that the case of Johnson v. Zerbst, [304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938)] laid down
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after being informed of his right to retain counsel, the prisoner may be able
to get the commissioner's preliminary hearing postponed so he can obtain
the assistance of counsel. 291 Another consideration is that if the defendant
were not able to obtain counsel at the hearing, or arraignment, the ques-
tion of a "fair trial" might be raised in later proceedings. 292 However,
the absence of a "fair trial" will depend largely on the circumstances of
the individual case.2 93
At the preliminary hearing, the rights of the alien are not quite as
broad as the defendant's in a criminal proceeding. However, under due
process, the alien may be able to show that denial of counsel violates the
Fifth Amendment. 294 The alien's rights at this hearing correspond to
those available at the time of arrest. The "due process" argument would
appear to be the most favorable route to take, if the alien's rights have
been infringed at such a hearing.29 5
Nearly all the protections afforded the alien in a deportation proceed-
ing come into operation at the deportation hearing itself. As indicated
previously, the criminal defendant does have certain rights to counsel be-
tween his arrest and actual trial, but the alien appears to have virtually no
remedy for an abridgment of the "Assistance of Counsel" mandate prior to
the deportation hearing.
3. At Final Hearing
As might be expected, at trial, the accused is afforded a considerable
amount of protection, and the right to counsel has been treated as an
"essential element of a fair hearing." As was stated in Moore v. State of
Michigan,296 the "case falls within that class in which the intervention of
counsel, unless intelligently waived by the accused, is an essential element
of a fair hearing. '29 7 Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
the basic principle now accepted throughout the Federal judicial system, that a
defendant appearing at arraignment without counsel must be apprised of his right to
counsel and is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him if he is unable to
retain counsel, unless he affirmatively waives that right."
291. United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905, 914-15 (D.D.C. 1961), in which
the court said, "Though the rule gives the accused a right to have the preliminary
hearing postponed until he has obtained the assistance of counsel .... ."(Emphasis
added.) See also, Rule 5 (b) which states, "The commissioner shall allow the de-
fendant reasonable time and opportunity to consult counsel."
292. Beaney, supra note 268, at 772.
293. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 440, 78 S. Ct. 1287, 1292 (1958),
"[Petitioner] would have every state denial of a request to contact counsel be an
infringement of the constitutional right without regard to the circumstances of the
case." See also, Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, 509-10, 78 S. Ct. 1297, 1300-01
(1958), ". . . petitioner would have us hold that any state denial of a defendant's
request to confer with counsel during police questioning violates due process, irre-
spective of the particular circumstances involved."
294. Gordon, supra note 285, at 879-80.
295. See De Bernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1958); 8 C.F.R. §
292.5(b), 23 Fed. Reg. 2673 (1958) ; GORDON & ROSENVIELD, § 1.23a; Gordon, supra
note 285, at 880.
296. 355 U.S. 155, 78 S. Ct. 191 (1957).
297. Id. at 160, 78 S. Ct. 194. See also, Kraft v. United States, 238 F.2d 794 (8th
Cir. 1956) : "He is entitled to the assistance of counsel at all stages of the proceedings
subsequent to the indictment, including those preliminary to his trial." Allen v. United
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requires appointment of counsel, if a prisoner appears in court without
counsel, cannot obtain counsel, and does not waive this right.2 8 Right to
representation of counsel is a fundamental right religiously upheld by the
Supreme Court, and in the absence of a waiver by the accused, the Court
will examine the trial record to determine whether or not the proceedings
were fair,299 and whether or not the "public conscience" is satisfied "that
fairness" dominated the "administration of justice." 00
Until 1938, there were no specific rulings that counsel had to be
appointed to represent a criminal defendant in a trial. In that year, the
Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Zerbst3 01 stated:
If the accused, however, is not represented by counsel and has not
competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and
sentence depriving him of his life or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction
at the beginning of trial may be lost "in the course of the proceedings"
due to failure to complete the court . . . by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently
waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at
stake.3 02
Thus, with Rule 44 and the holding in the Zerbst case, a criminal defendant
has the right to the assignment of counsel.30 3
In considering the plight of the alien, it should be remembered that
"[t] he resemblance in the situations of a respondent in a deportation hear-
ing and of a defendant in a criminal trial strongly suggests the desirability
of and need for representation by counsel in a deportation hearing."30 4
Also the Mallory rationale seems applicable because "[t] he present temper
of the United States Supreme Court, as expressed in its recent decisions
irresistibly predicts that . . . an attempted abridgement would receive short
shrift. °3 0 5 As pointed out heretofore, the statutes and regulations of the hn-
States, 102 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Il1. 1952): "The Sixth Amendment guarantees that
'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence'. This is not a mere procedural formality, but
constitutes a safeguard deemed necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life
and liberty." Id. at 868.
298. "If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every stage of the
proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is able to retain counsel."
299. "Whatever our decision might have been if the trial court had informed him
of his right and conscientiously had undertaken to perform the functions ordinarily
entrusted to counsel, we conclude that the opportunity to have counsel in this case
was a necessary element of a fair hearing." Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437,
442, 69 S. Ct. 184, 186 (1948).
300. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S. Ct. 236, 241 (1943).
301. 304 U.S. 458, 58 S. Ct. 1019 (1938).
302. Id. at 467-68, 58 S. Ct. at 1024.
303. See also, BARRON, op. cit. supra note 277, at § 2461; MORELAND, op. Cit.
supra note 277, at 177.
304. Gordon, snupra note 285, at 883.
305. Id. at 884.
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migration Service assure an alien the right to have counsel represent him
at the deportation proceeding.3 06
Under the administrative regulations, the inquiry officer has an
affirmative duty to inform the alien of his right to retain counsel. 30 7 Even
though the alien has no right to have counsel appointed, he can obtain a
list of authorized attorneys or organizations which will supply representa-
tion for the indigent alien.3 0 8 Thus,.with the affirmative duty to inform the
alien of his right to obtain counsel, it would appear the alien must be given
a "fair opportunity" to obtain representation. However, if the alien were
given such an opportunity, and failed to obtain counsel to represent him, the
deportation hearing would probably continue. 30 9 Since the Immigration
statutes and administrative regulations do require that the alien be informed
of his right to representation, it would be "meaningless if the respondent"
did "not have a reasonable opportunity to exercise it because of improper
influence or action by government officers insufficient notification of his
rights, inadequate comprehension of the language, or because of mental
incapacity. ' 310 With the duties required by the regulations, if the explana-
tion by the inquiry officer were not clear and understandable by the alien,
the hearing would in all probability violate due process. 311 Section 1252(b)
specifically states the alien shall have the privilege of being represented at
no expense to the government, thus making appointment of counsel un-
necessary under the Congressional statute. Also, in Alves v. Shaugh-
nessy,31 2 the court decided that even though the alien could not obtain
counsel due to lack of monetary resources, "[t]he facts set out an unam-
biguously clear case in which 'failure to have counsel, if error, like other
errors, may not be prejudicial.' "313 Thus, the present state of the law
confers on the alien no right to the appointment of counsel. 314
306. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a), 22 Fed. Reg. 9795 (1957); 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(c), 22
Fed. Reg. 9809 (1957) ; 66 Stat. 235 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1953); 66 Stat. 208,
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1953).
307. 8 C.F.R. § 242.16(a) states: "The special inquiry officer shall advise the re-
spondent of his right to representation, at no expense to the Government, by counsel
of his own choice authorized to practice in the proceedings and require him to state
then and there whether he desires representation."
308. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(c), which requires that a "roster of attorneys and of
representatives of organizations" be maintained and be kept up to date.
309. Gordon, supra note 285, at 885.
310. Id. at 885-86
311. See generally, GORDON & ROStNVIELD, at § 1.23a.
312. 107 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
313. Id. at 445.
314. See De Bernardo v. Rogers, 254 F.2d 81 (D.C. Cir. 1958) : "It is un-
necessary to decide whether due process requires that counsel be appointed to repre-
sent an indigent defendant in a deportation proceeding, because the facts on which
deportation was ordered in this case were not in issue." Id. at 82.
In re Raimondi, 126 F. Supp. 390, 394 (N.D. Cal. 1954): "The right to
counsel in deportation proceedings has been expressly limited by Congress to counsel
retained by the person involved, at no cost to the Government. . . . But without
deciding whether due process would require that in special circumstances a person
should be furnished with counsel if he is without funds to employ one, the Court
rests its decision in this case on the fact that here the absence of counsel was not
prejudicial."
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Once the alien does obtain counsel, at his own expense, the attorney
is given full reign to adequately represent the alien client.315 The alien
can of course waive any right to representation by counsel, but any such
waiver must be clear and made intelligently. For the waiver of counsel,
there are certain duties imposed upon the inquiry officer to which he must
adhere so that the waiver fully meets the requirements of a fair hearing. 316
One such requirement stipulates the alien must be clearly informed of his
right to counsel, and the waiver must be made with clear understanding of
the right.3 17 In determining if the waiver has been made intelligently, the
"fundamental yardstick" is whether under all the circumstances, the hear-
ing was fair and the alien had full understanding of all his rights.318
K. Application of Evidentiary Rules
An alien may be subject to deportation for basically one of four
reasons: (1) an illegal entry,3 19 (2) an overstay of a permitted but limited
entry,320 (3) the commission of a deportable offense before entry,32'1 and
(4) the commission of a deportable offense after entry.3 22 For purposes of
pursuing procedural techniques and the use of evidence in deportation pro-
ceedings the first two may be grouped into one category and the last two
may be grouped into another. In the first group the burden of proof is
on the alien to show why he should be allowed to remain in the country,
and in the latter category the government must prove that the alien has
forfeited his right to stay through misconduct.
Regardless of the reason for deportation, the alien is entitled to a fair
hearing within the meaning of the due process clause3 23 before a special
inquiry officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to determine
whether he is subject to deportation.3 2 4 It follows that it is incumbent upon
315. "Whenever an examination is provided for in this chapter, the person in-
volved shall have the right to be represented by an attorney or representative who
shall be permitted to examine or cross-examine such person and witnesses, to introduce
evidence, to make objections which shall be stated succinctly and entered on the record,
and to submit briefs." 8 C.F.R. § 292.5(b) (1958).
316. See Bisaillor v. Hogan, 257 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1958).
317. See Barrese v. Ryan, 189 F. Supp. 449 (D. Conn. 1960). See also Barrese
v. Ryan, 203 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Conn. 1962), in which the court stated, "Plaintiff
has at best a limited comprehension of the English language, as demonstrated by his
testimony before the special inquiry officer as well as before this court. He was not
represented by counsel at the time of his testimony before the special inquiry officer
relied on by the government. To permit deportation of a man who has been a resident
of the United States for nearly a half century to turn upon such testimony, under
the circumstances disclosed, would be little short of ludicrous."
318. Gordon, supra note 285, at 892-93; Van Den Berg v. Lehmann, 261 F.2d
828, 829 (6th Cir. 1958), in which the case was remanded "with direction that the
proceedings be stayed so that appellant will have the right and opportunity after due
notice, to be represented by counsel of his own choice ....
319. Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 306 (3d Cir. 1924).
320. Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
321. Gilles v. Del Guercio, 150 F. Supp. 864 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
322. Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 306 (3d Cir. 1924).
323. United States cx rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923)
Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957) ; Gilles v. Del Guerico, 150
F. Supp. 864 (1957) ; 59 W. VA. L. Rnv. 199 (1957).
324. Ungar v. Seaman, 4 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1924).
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the government to establish why the alien should be deported and to support
it by sufficient evidence. The standard or quantum of proof required of the
government to establish its case against the alien is substantial evidence or a
fair preponderance of the evidence.325 Federal law provides that "no deci-
sion of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, sub-
stantial and probative evidence. ' 326 Since the hearing is classified as being
civil in nature,327 such a standard seems to be in conformity with the
traditional common law rule applicable to civil litigation.
The deportation hearing is also classified as an administrative pro-
ceeding, 328 and consequently the common law judicial rules of evidence do
not bind the government in fulfilling its standard of proof.3 29 The only
limitation to this rule is that the evidentiary rules cannot be disregarded to
the extent that the failure to apply such rules would necessarily result in a
denial of due process.330 But it is well settled that "a hearing does not
cease to be fair merely because rules of evidence ... have not been strictly
followed ...or because some evidence has been improperly received. 3 3 1
Where the right to deport is based on misconduct, a presumption of
innocence exists for the alien, and the burden is upon government to
establish the fact of guilt.33 2  The government is allowed great latitude
in establishing its case. Any substantial evidence,3 3 3 provided it is rele-
vant,3 3 4 is sufficient to establish the government's case even though some
or all of the evidence would have been inadmissible under the usual eviden-
tiary requirements. Hearsay evidence is admissible, 33 5 but it has been held
that it is essential to a fair hearing that the alien have an opportunity to
explain or rebut the hearsay evidence.33 6 Where the only evidence to es-
tablish the offense was nothing but pure hearsay, the court found that it
did not meet the requirement of substantiality as a result of which the
hearing was considered unfair.337
325. GoRDON & ROSENFIELD, § 5.10b; Matter of H., 3 I. & N. Dec. 411, 444
(1949) ; Palmer v. Ultimo, 69 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1934), where it was said that the
burden is on the government to make out a case and the test is whether there is any
substantial evidence. Ulmer v. Phillips, 24 F. Supp. 115 (D.C. Mont. 1938) ; Tutrone
v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
326. § 242 (b) (4), 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (b) (4) (1952).
327. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 363 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923)
Nicoli v. Buggs, 83 F.2d 375 (10th Cir. 1936).
328. Kunimori Ohara v. Berkshire, 76 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1935); Di Battista v.
Hughes, 299 Fed. 99 (3d Cir. 1924).
329. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 4c (3d ed. 1940) ; Palmer v. Ultimo, 69 F.2d 1 (7th
Cir. 1934).
330. Supra note 323.
331. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923).
332. Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 306 (3d Cir. 1924); Werrmann v. Perkins,
79 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1935).
333. In the Yiannopoulos case, 247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957), it was said that
"substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
334. Holz v. Del Guerico, 259 F.2d 84 (9th Cir. 1958).
335. Morrell v. Baker, 270 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1920); Yiannopoulos v. Robinson,
247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1959).
336. Lewis v. Johson, 16 F.2d 180 (1st Cir. 1926); Sercerchi v. Ward, 27 F.
Supp. 437 (D.C. Mass. 1939).
337. Yiannopoulos v. Robinson, 247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957). The court relied
on the words of Mr. Justice Douglas in Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 156, 65
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If the alien institutes litigation to stay an order of deportation, the
evidentiary rules appear to be even less stringent. The leading case of
Jay v. Boyd 33 8 held that the Attorney General may consider confidential
information outside the record in formulating his discretionary decision.
Where the interest and security of the country are at stake, it is not
necessary to disclose such information to the alien.339 The existence of
these two rules relating to quantum of proof and the means to attain that
quantum represent powerful weapons at the disposal of the government in
deporting an alien and are significantly contradictory to the general rules
applied whenever penal sanctions are to be imposed upon an individual.
In any criminal proceeding the burden is upon the prosecution to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged offense has in fact
occurred. Although attempts to define precisely what is meant by "beyond
a reasonable doubt" have met with varied success, 340 it is obvious that this
standard would represent a significant increase over the quality and amount
of evidence necessary to meet a standard of "fair preponderance of the
evidence." A state will undergo great expense to convince a jury to a
degree of certainty equivalent to that which would be present for' ordinarily
reasonable and prudent men to act without hesitation in the most important
affairs of life, 341 in order to sentence someone to a few months in prison.
But, where a man may be banished from a country in which he has lived
for over fifty years 342 and sent to a place where, although not legally, he
will in fact be an alien,3 43 such a punishment may be imposed only on a fair
preponderance evidence, which more than likely will be tainted with ir-
relevant and ordinarily inadmissible evidence. Here, as in other areas thus
far examined, responsibility for the oppressive difference in the quality of
evidence necessary to convict and necessary to deport is borne by the
categorization of the latter proceedings as administrative of civil in
character.
Since only an alien can be subject to deportation, alienage is a juris-
dictional issue on which the government carries the burden of proof. This
is the initial fact to be proven in any hearing. In establishing alienage, it
S. Ct. 1443, 1453 (1945): "[T]he case is different where evidence was improperly
received and where but for that evidence it is wholly speculative whether the requisite
finding would have been made. Then there is deportation without a fair hearing ....(Emphasis added.) And in McNeil v. Kennedy, 298 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1962), it was
held improper to issue an order of deportation when alienage was established by
unverified or unauthenticated documents.
338. 351 U.S. 345, 76 S. Ct. 919 (1956).
339. Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ; Milutin v. Bouchard,
299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962), case remanded, 370 U.S. 292, 82 S. Ct. 1562 (1962).
340. MORGAN, MAQUIRE, & WEINSTFIN, EvIDENcn, 437 (1957).
341. Miller v. State, 139 Wisc. 57, 119 N.W. 850 (1909).
342. Tutrone v. Shaughnessy, 160 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
343. Id. at 437: The court quoted Judge Learned Hand in Mignozzi v. Day, 51
F.2d 1019, 1021 (2d Cir. 1931), where he said, "To root up all those associations
which we call home, to banish him to be an outcast in a country of whose traditions
and habits he knows nothing, and where his alienage is a daily, living fact, not a
legal imputation-these are consequences whose warrant we may properly scrutinize
with some jealousy, and insist that logic shall not take the place of understanding."
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is only necessary for the government to prove that the accused was born
in a foreign country. Once this is shown the person is presumed to be an
alien. 344, In some cases the failure of the accused to testify has been held
to constitute evidence tending to prove that he was an alien.3 45 The justi-
fication has been that since the proceeding is civil in nature, an unfavorable
inference may be drawn from the defendant's failure to testify. As Mr.
Justice Brandeis has put it, "Silence is often evidence of the most per-
suasive character. . . . There was a strong reason why he should have
asserted citizenship. . . . [U]nder these circumstances his failure to claim
that he was a citizen and his refusal to testify on this subject had a tendency
to prove that he was an alien. 3 40 It should be noted that this inference
has been used as corroborative evidence and is not sufficient in itself to
establish alienage.
Analogous to the government's burden of proving alienage in a de-
portation proceeding appears to be the necessity of establishing the corpus
delictl in a criminal case. But, naturally, in a criminal case the state would
be obliged to follow strict evidentiary rules and would not be aided in
establishing the corpus delicti by reason of the defendant's failure to testify.
In nearly all the states, statutes specifically proscribe comment by the court
or by counsel on the failure of the defendant to testify on his own behalf. 34 7
In those few jurisdictions where such comment is permitted, it is usually
held that the court should explain to the jury that the prosecution has the
burden of adducing evidence of guilt, independent of the inference from
silence.34
8
Once alienage has been established, the burden is on the alien to prove
that he is in the country legally.34 9 The status of the alien is presumed to
have continued until the contrary is shown.350 Therefore, if the alien fails
to produce the proper papers, the establishment of alienage by the govern-
ment would be sufficient to issue an order of deportation.3 5 1 Generally,
an alien has been unsuccessful in trying to establish citizenship by a mere
claim as a witness in his own behalf.3 52 On appeal, the reviewing court
will order a judicial inquiry into the claimant's citizenship only when in
344. Rongetti v. Neeley, 207 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1953); Circella v. Sahli, 216
F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Kunimori Ohara v. Berkshire, 76 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1935)
Chan Nom Gee v. United States, 57 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1932).
345. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923)
Circella v. Sahli, 216 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1959).
346. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54, 56.
347. McCoRMICK, EvmI.NcE, 276 (1954).
348. Id. at 279.
349. § 291, 66 Stat. 234 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1958).
350. Barilla v. Uhl, 27 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
351. Hughes v. Tropello, 296 Fed. 306 (3d Cir. 1924); Bishop v. Watkins, 159
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1947); Milutin v. Bouchard, 299 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1962); Harris
v. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Division, 161 F. Supp. 59
(E.D. Mich. 1958). The statute provides that if the burden is not sustained, the
alien is presumed to be in the country in violation of the law. 8 U.S.C. § 1361.
352. Rongetti v. Neeley, 207 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1953); Bishop v. Watkins, 159
F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Barrilla v. Uhl, 27 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
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addition to the claim of citizenship there is some substantial evidence in
support of the claim.3 5
3
These first two burdens of proof appear to be reasonable to the en-
cumbered parties. The establishment of alienage by the government is a
logical requirement, and the burden on the alien to prove legal entry and
residence through the production of visas or the equivalent is not overly
oppressive, especially in view of federal law which provides that the alien
"shall be entitled to the production of his visa or other entry documents"
in order to establish such fact.35 4
Technically, in a criminal case the burden of proof can never shift to
the defendant because of the presumption of innocence of the defendant . 55
There is nothing even remotely similar to such a presumption in a deporta-
tion proceeding. The government's case is obviously reduced to the simplest
mechanical presentation of evidence in a proceeding that may result in
disastrous conequences to the alien.
L. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution provides that "No person
• . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
• . ." The wording of this constitutional privilege shows that it extends to
"persons" and is not restricted to citizens, adults, or minors or any other
class. The Supreme Court has held that it is restricted to natural indi-
viduals3 ' and that one person cannot claim it in order to protect another
person.35 7 It is clear therefore that the privilege extends beyond citizenry
and there is no reason for restricting the privilege when asserted by an
alien in a deportation proceeding. The privilege against self-incrimination
is available to a defendant in a federal criminal case and it has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court so that it may be invoked in a bankruptcy
proceeding,3 55 grand jury proceedings3 '1 and in Congressional investiga-
tions.3 60 In McCarthy v. Arndstein, a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court
pointed out that the privilege is not to be restricted to the words of the
amendment itself. "The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the
nature of the proceedings in which the testimony is sought or to be used.
It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it."3 6 ' Fur-
thermore, in Blau v. United States3 62 the privilege was recognized to be
available to a witness before a grand jury since the witness could reason-
353. Morrell v. Baker, 270 Fed. 577 (2d Cir. 1920); Yiannopoulos v. Robinson,
247 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1957).
354. Ibid.
355. State v. Strawther, 343 Mo. 618, 116 S.W.2d 133 (1938).
356. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S. Ct. 1248 (1944).
357. Rodgers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 438 (1951).
358. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 45 S. Ct. 16 (1924).
359. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159, 71 S. Ct. 223 (1950).
360. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 75 S. Ct. 668 (1955).
361. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40, 45 S. Ct. 16, 17 (1924).
362. 340 U.S. 159, 71 S. Ct. 223 (1950).
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ably fear that criminal charges might be brought as result of answering
certain questions concerning her relationship with the Communist Party.
The privilege therefore can be invoked where there is a threat that the one
who invokes it may be subject to some kind of criminal penalty and not
merely during a criminal proceeding in which the one who invokes the
privilege is the defendant.
The privilege was incorporated into our Constitution to prevent a
recurrence of the evils which arose during the Inquisition and in the Star
Chamber. 30 3 The Court in Brown v. Walker36 4 recognized it as "one of
the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen." At early common law, a
criminal defendant was not competent to testify in his own behalf.
Congress by statute3 6 5 has given the criminal defendant competence
and also in the same statute buttressed his privilege against self-incrimin-
ation by providing that if he should refuse to take the stand no presump-
tion can be raised against him due to such refusal. The Court, in inter-
preting an earlier version of the same statute, held that a defendant who
does not take the stand can have the jury instructed that his failure to take
the stand does not raise a presumption against him.3 66 The safeguards
afforded the criminal defendant against self-incrimination are necessary
because of the severe sanctions imposed by law which can result in the loss
of personal liberty by confinement or loss of property by way of fines which
may be levied. This protection, however, does not isolate the defendant in
a vacuum; if he does take the stand in his own behalf a jury may be in-
structed by the judge that they can consider a defendant's interest in the
outcome of the case when weighing his testimony and considering his
credibility.3 6 7
In a deportation proceeding an alien's rights are not as fully protected
as are the criminal defendant's rights in a federal court. As has already
been indicated 368 the alien does not enjoy a presumption of citizenship in
a deportation proceeding ;369 the criminal defendant enjoys the presump-
tion of innocence. If an alien refuses to answer questions concerning the
basis of his deportation an inference may be drawn from this refusal.370
Even where an alien has invoked the privilege under the Fifth Amendment
and refused to answer questions relating to place and date of his birth and
his citizenship an inference was drawn from his conduct .3 7  An alien's
363. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S. Ct. 497 (1956).
364. 161 U.S. 591, 610, 16 S. Ct. 644, 652 (1896).
365. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1958).
366. Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 297, 60 S. Ct. 198 (1939).
367. Reagan v. United States, 157 U.S. 301, 15 S. Ct. 610 (1895).
368. See section III, L of this Note.
369. United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 44 S. Ct. 54 (1923).
370. Hyun v. Landon, 219 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816,
76 S. Ct. 70; aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 350 U.S. 990, 76 S. Ct.
541 (1956) ; Kjar v. Doak, 61 F.2d 566 (7th Cir. 1932).
371. Caetano v. Shaughnessy, 133 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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silence can be used as evidence against him37 2 but some courts have avoided
this injustice by finding other evidence sufficient to uphold the decisionY 3
In United Stites v. Murdock37 4 the Court held that a citizen under
investigation by a federal agency cannot invoke the privilege on the ground
that his answer may incriminate him under a state law. This result was
based on the English rule which does not protect witnesses against incrim-
inating themselves under the laws of another country,375 An alien can be
compelled to testify by a subpoena 376 and cannot refuse to answer on the
grounds that his answer may incriminate him under state law, but he
cannot be compelled to answer questions which would tend to incriminate
him under a federal statute due to the Fifth Amendment privilege. 7  A
citizen in like manner may be subpoenaed and the privilege is still available
to himY7 8
The privilege against self-incrimination is by definition not an absolute
right and can be waived. The courts are reluctant to find a waiver of the
privilege3 7 9 where a criminal defendant is involved as they are with any
express privilege in the Constitution. However, once the accused takes
the stand in his own defense he cannot claim the privilege when being
cross-examined on his direct testimony. Where a person does answer
criminating questions, he cannot later invoke the privilege in order to
protect another, or to avoid giving details concerning the criminating
matter already freely given.380 This points up the personal nature of the
privilege in that the protection is against self-incrimination and is not
available to protect others. In addition, one cannot invoke the privilege
to avoid giving the complete aspects of a particular issue. Where a witness
invokes the privilege and during the questioning interposes an answer
without invoking the privilege, this will not be held to be a waiver of his
previous invocation of the privilege.38 1
A criminal defendant may answer some questions and then invoke
the privilege even though a question may be harmless in and of itself. If
it could form a link in a chain which might lead to incrimination it is for
the court to decide if the invocation of the privilege is justifiable by exam-
ining the circumstances of the case,38 2 and if the linkage is reasonable.38 3
This feature of the privilege is understandable, since the privilege exists to
protect a person from being compelled to incriminate himself it most
372. United States ex rcl. Zapp v. District Director, 120 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1941).
373. DeLucia v. Flagg, 297 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied. 369 U.S. 837,
82 S. Ct. 867 (1962) ; Ocon v. Del Guercio, 237 F.2d 177 (9th Cir. 1956) ; Alexander
v. Butterfield, 150 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
374. 284 U.S. 141, 52 S. Ct. 63 (1931).
375. Id. at 149, 52 S. Ct. at 64.
376. Sherman v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1961), ccrt. dcnicd, 369 U.S.
820, 82 S. Ct. 827 (1962).
377. Graham v. United States, 99 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1938).
378. Pfitizinger v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 96 F. Supp. 1 (D. N.J.
1951), aff'd, 192 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1951).
379. Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137, 69 S. Ct. 1000 (1949).
380. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S. Ct. 438 (1951).
381. Empack v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S. Ct. 687 (1955).
382. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S. Ct. 814 (1951).
383. United States v. Coffey, 198 F.2d 438 (3d Cir. 1952).
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naturally should extend to the case where he might be compelled to build a
case against himself. This body of law has been carefully constructed by
the judiciary ever attentive to the need for protection of the criminal de-
fendant. No such consideration has been given to the plight of the alien.
Although an alien may avail himself of the privilege,38 4 he must specifically
invoke it the privilege; a mere refusal to answer will not suffice.38 5 An
inference may be drawn from such silence even if the question involves the
very basis of his deportation .3 6
Deportation is punishment. The fifth amendment privilege must
therefore logically extend to and permit an alien to refuse to answer any
question, the reply to which could form the basis of deportation or be
used against him in a deportation proceeding. If an alien refuses to answer
any such question, no unfavorable inference should be drawn.
M. Post-Hearing Remedies
1. Appellate Review
All appellate remedies, with the exception of habeas corpus, are pro-
vided for by statute., They are not elements of due process 387 even in the
criminal law, where one could more readily see the necessity for review.
At common law the right to an appellate review was not absolute nor a
necessary part of due process.3 8 At present, state and federal statutes
provide adequate remedies to review the actions of the lower courts.
These statutory remedies in the realm of criminal procedure are the
principal source of post-conviction remedies. Under Rule 33 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure a court may grant a new trial if the interest
of justice so requires. Under this rule any error which has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice is grounds for a new trial.3 8 9 In the past the courts
have granted new trials for want of time to prepare for trial,3 9 0 incompe-
tency of counsel, 391 and denial of a separate trial.3 92 A motion based on
these grounds must be raised within five days. In addition, a two year
statute of limitations permits the defendant to move for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence. 393 Rule 34 provides for an arrest of judg-
ment if the court was without jurisdiction or the information or indictment
does not charge an offense and for the writ of certiorari.
However, these remedies did not solve all the problems. Once the time
limit had passed and the defendant was no longer in custody his appellate
remedies were lost. A court's decision, though constitutionally unsound,
could not be vacated or corrected. This dilemma prompted the adoption of
384. Caetano v. Shaughnessy, 133 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
385. United States ex rel Vajtauer v. Comm'r, 273 U.S. 103, 47 S. Ct. 302 (1927).
386. Quilodran-Bran v. Holland, 232 F.2d 183 (3d Cir. 1956).
387. People v. Gersewitz, 294 N.Y. 163, 61 N.E.2d 427 (1945).
388. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 14 S. Ct. 913 (1894).
389. N.S. v. Parelius, 83 F. Supp. 617 (D. Hawaii 1949).
390. Tabor v. United States, 175 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1949).
391. United States v. Haynes, 81 F. Supp. 63 (3d Cir. 1948).
392. United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943).
393. Oddo v. United States, 171 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
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the common law writ of coram nobis in 1954 39 4 The writ has no time limit
or custody requirement. Its purpose generally is to review and correct
findings of fact. 395 Although the writ was not specifically provided for by
statute the Court derived its power to take cognizance of motions in the
nature of coram nobis from the all-writs section of the Judicial Code. 396
There is one appellate remedy, however, provided for and guaranteed
by the United States Constitution. This is the celebrated common law
writ of habeas corpus. "9 7 Although the petitioner must be in custody at the
time of application, the uniqueness of the writ comes from the fact that
there is no time limit for the application, nor is there any limit to the
number of applications a prisoner may make; prior dismissal of that appli-
cation will not bar a subsequent application and the doctrine of res judicata
will not apply.398 The federal courts constantly stress the importance,
necessity and sanctity of the ancient writ and it appears that the Supreme
Court now demands that the states provide for a similar remedy by statute
or within their constitution.3 9 Generally the requirements 40 0 are that the
applicant be in lawful custody and has exhausted all state remedies. Orig-
inally, the writ was used largely to test the jurisdiction of the lower court. 4 11
This is still true, but today it is more commonly in use to test the validity
of the prisoner's detention on constitutional grounds40 2 and the unlawful
restraint of personal liberty. 40 3 A timely application is made any time
during the criminal process when such an infraction might arise whereby
state court proceedings could be stayed until the validity of the detention
had been determined. 40 4 However most applications come at the end of
the proceedings, usually during the term when the sentence is being
served.40 5 The reason for this is that the courts are not accustomed to
interfere with or to interrupt the judicial processes of the state courts, and
then only when exceptional circumstances can be shown. 40  So, though
394. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S. Ct. 247 (1954).
395, Ibid.
396. Id. at 506, 74 S. Ct. at 250. The all-writs section is found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651 (a).
397. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9. Also provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Blackstone
names four writs of habeas corpus: ad respondendum; ad satis faciendunt; ad prose-
qieendun, testificandunt, deliberandutii; ad faciendurn et recepiendum. 3 BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES 129-32; United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 1330 (1947).
398. State v. Wall, 187 Minn. 246, 244 N.W. 811 (1932).
399. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 69 S. Ct. 1073 (1949).
400. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
401. Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193 (1830) ; People v. Doyle, 232 N.Y. 96, 133
N.E. 364 (1921).
402. Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 59 S. Ct. 442 (1939) ; Waley v. Johnston,
306 U.S. 101, 62 S. Ct. 964 (1942) ; United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct.
1330 (1947).
403. Coffin v. Teichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
404. 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (1958).
405. For a collection of recent decisions involving time of application, subjects
reviewable and requirements for habeas corpus, see the annotations in 28 U.S.C.A.§ 2241.
406. Jones v. Perkins, 245 U.S. 390, 38 S. Ct. 166 (1918).
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the writ is always available, an interlocutory issuance of it must be justified
by the surrounding circumstances. 40 7
In the area of administrative law there appellate review is somewhat
analogous. Since deportation proceedings are not considered criminal in
nature40 8 and are largely governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act
rather than by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, deportation is
strictly an administrative process. 'he methods of review are different
despite the similarities of deportation to a criminal proceeding pointed out
by the Supreme Court in noting that, "[D]eportation is a drastic meas-
ure and at times equivalent of banishment or exile. . . It is the for-
feiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is
a penalty. '40 9
The right to review or to seek review had never been expressly au-
thorized though it was vaguely mentioned in the Act of 1952. By its
amendment, however, judicial ieview is provided for. The courts use this
only as a procedural guide and those methods heretofore provided by the
courts still prevail.410 At one time the only remedy available to an alien
was the writ of habeas corpus. Now the right to declaratory judgment has
been added. 41 '
The one sharp difference between the criminal and administrative
process is that in the latter only final orders are reviewable. But, similar
to the criminal cases, the courts will step in where irreparable injury can
be shown. 412 By comparison it will suffice to say that just as in criminal
law where the state remedies must be exhausted before redress can be had,
in the federal courts all administrative remedies must be tried before these
appellate remedies are available. Again the reason for this rule is the same;
courts will hesitate before interfering until the administrative processes
have been completed. 413
Very little can be said about seeking recourse by declaratory judgment.
In the absence of clear legislative direction the courts have looked to Rule
57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.414 Generally its purpose is to
challenge the finding of deportability, 415 and the denial of descretionary
relief,4 16 but the constitutionality of the deportation can also be questioned.
The review, therefore, is much like the review of any administrative ruling
407. Generally the following circumstances are considered: other available rem-
edies, Re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178, 26 S. Ct. 602 (1906); justification for interference
with the administration of justice, Hunter v. Wood, 209 U.S. 205, 28 S. Ct. 472(1908); a decision in the prisoner's favor would result in his release rather than a
remand to custody, Re Durrant, 169 U.S. 39, 18 S. Ct. 291 (1898).
408. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 37 S. Ct. 31 (1912) ; Harisiades v. Shaugh-
nessy, 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952).
409. Fong Haw Tan v. United States, 333 U.S. 6, 10, 68 S. Ct. 374, 376 (1948).This opinion was again expressed in 1954 in Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 74
S. Ct. 822 (1954).
410. 75 Stat. 651 (1961), 8 U.S.C. § 1105 (a) (1962).
411. Shaughnessy v. Pedriero, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S. Ct. 591 (1955).
412. Eisler v. Clark, 77 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1948).
413. Haymes v. Landon, 115 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
414. G011DON & ROSENFIELD, § 8.9.
415. Shaughnessy v. Pedriero, 349 U.S. 48, 75 S. Ct. 591 (1955).
416. Cehallos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599, 577 S. Ct. 545 (1957).
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and as will be seen it adds very little to the scope of review given through
habeas corpus. As is also true with habeas corpus the deportation order
will be stayed pending final outcome on appeal. 417 The vital differences
between this method and the common law writ are that custody is not
necessary and the doctrine of res judicata is applicable. 418
The writ of habeas corpus, on the other hand, applies much the same
here as it did in the criminal proceeding. The nature and scope of the
review cannot change from one proceeding to the next. It is employed in
the same manner by alien and prisoner alike.41 '9 Res judicata is inappli-
cable, 420 the irrelevancy of time and number of applications remain the
same, 421 and it must be the last line of defense for both.
In contrast, the law seems to favor the criminal defendant as far as
the number and availability of judicial remedies are concerned. Yet there
seems to be a trend in the direction of affording the alien greater protection.
However, the sharp contrast cannot be overlooked. Whereas rules of
criminal procedure provide for new trials and possible reductions in sen-
tences by appellate courts the alien must be satisfied with remands for such
things as abuse of discretion, errors of law or lack of substantial evidence
to support the conclusion, 422 or possible release through habeas corpus and,
as has been recently decided, once the deportation order is affirmed and
the destination of the alien is set it is conclusive and not subject to
review. 4
23
2. Protecting Deportable Aliens from Physical Persecution
There is one additional post-conviction remedy of the alien that the
criminal defendant does not have.
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the
alien would be subject to physical persecution. 424 This provision modified
the language of the earlier statutes425 in a manner which shows clearly,
that the withholding of deportation in cases where the alien fears persecu-
tion rests wholly in the administrative judgment and "opinion" of the At-
torney General and his delegate. 426 The courts may not substitute their
judgment for his, even though his may be based on confidential information,
undisclosed to the alien.427 However, where the court found that the alien
417. 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1958).
418. Estenez v. Nabers, 219 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1955).
419. See Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 59 S. Ct. 694 (1939).
420. Cruz-Sanchez v. Robinson, 136 F. Supp. 52 (D. Cal. 1955).
421. United States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 67 S. Ct. 1330 (1947).
422. United States v. Neelly, 207 F.2d 281 (7th Cir. 1953).
423. Lan Man Chi v. Bouchard, 31 U.S.L. Week 2429 (3d Cir., Feb. 26, 1963).
424. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 243 (h), 66 Stat. 212 (1952),
8 U.S.C. 1253 (h) (1953).
425. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1917 § 20, 39 Stat. 890 (1917), as
amended, 64 Stat. 1010 (1950), 8 U.S.C. § 156 (1958).
426. United States cx rel. Dolenz v. Shaughnessy, 206 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1953).
427. Ibid.
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was denied the "full and fair opportunity to present relevant and important
evidence in support of his application for suspension of deportation," it
overturned the Attorney General's order denying the alien relief.428 Such
a decision, however, does not appear to limit the discretion of the Attorney
General in this matter. Rather it affects the rights of the alien to present
all relevant information to the Attorney General before he makes the
determination.
429
While this feature of the Immigration Act appears to represent a
departure from the comparatively summary treatment given the alien by
giving him one last chance which the criminal defendant does not have,
its effectiveness is impaired due to a lack of extensive judicial supervision.
In a circumstance where the Attorney General is not satisfied with the
alien's claim of physical persecution it is obvious that deportation is the
severest of penalties.
3. Detention Between Issuance of the Order and Deportation
The Immigration Act endows the Attorney General with wide dis-
cretion in controlling the alien's custody prior to actual deportation. For
a period of six months after the deportation order becomes final, the
Attorney General is empowered to determine at his discretion whether the
deportee is to be detained, or released on bond or conditional parole.
430
Courts will correct abuses if such discretionary power is not reasonably
exercised. Thus, where bail was denied, it was held that since no reason-
able expectation of deportation existed within the six month period, denial
of bail was arbitrary. 431 However, on the same matter where the court
found that there was no certainty that deportation could not be accomplished
within the six-month period, denial of bail was not deemed unreasonable.
432
428. Paschalides v. District Director, 143 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
429. For other cases on the subject of relief from physical persecution see Blazina
v. Bouchard, 286 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950, 81 S. Ct. 1904;
United States ex rel. Contisani v. Holton, 248 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied.
356 U.S. 932, 78 S. Ct. 774; United States ex rel. Namkung v. Boyd, 226 F.2d 385
(9th Cir. 1955) ; Radic v. Fullilove, 198 F. Supp. 162 (N.D. Cal. 1961) ; Vardjon v.
Esperdy, 197 F. Supp. 931 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 279; Granado Alneida
v. Murff, 159 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also Note, Protecting Deportable
Aliens From Physical Persecution; Section 243 (h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, 62 YALt L. J. 845 (1953), which takes the position that by possibly
eliminating a full hearing on the issue of physical persecution and by granting the
Attorney General broad discretion to deport in any event, § 243 (h) may exceed the
limits of constitutionality. See Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals
For Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 362 (1956). The author suggests that "no
alien should be deported to any country where he may be subjected to racial, religious,
or physical persecution. The Immigration and Naturalization Service should be
required to make findings on an alien's claim of persecution after a formal hearing
before a special inquiry officer, subject to the appeal of the Board of Immigration
Appeals and thence to the courts. Decisions on these claims should be made solely
upon the evidence adduced at such a hearing."
430. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 242 (c), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8
U.S.C. § 1252 (c) (1958).
431. United States ex rel. Kusman v. District Director, 117 F. Supp. 541
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
432. United States ex rel. Blankenstein v. Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 699
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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But, for the most part, detention has been invoked in only extreme cases
where the alien would be menacing the public safety or security by being
free, or where the alien would likely make himself unavailable for deporta-
tion once final arrangements were made.433 Thus where an alien was placed
in custody without bond, and the Government could make no positive
showing that the alien, if released on bond, would not be available for
deportation, the court held that the alien sustained the burden that his
detention without bond was without a reasonable foundation. 434
The Act 43 5 . further provides for a system of supervision over aliens
against whom a final order of deportation has been issued and been out-
standing for more than six months. The Attorney General has the power
to supervise the alien, pending eventual deportation, in the following re-
pects; (1) to appear from time to time before an immigration officer for
identification; (2) to submit, if necessary, to medical and psychiatric
examination at the expense of the United States; (3) to give information
under oath as to his nationality, circumstance, habits, associations, and
activities, and such other information, whether or not related to the fore-
going, as the Attorney General may deem fit and proper and (4) to con-
form to such reasonable written restrictions on his conduct or activities
as are prescribed by the Attorney General in his case. This provision was
needed because it was felt that after six months have passed without the
deportation order being executed, there would be little likelihood that it
would ever be accomplished. Consequently, any further detention would
have the appearance of a punishment instead of an expulsion. It fills the
gap created by the fact that the Attorney General has no authority to
continue the alien in custody or to require a bond after the expiration of
the six-month period.43
6
Such a system of supervision has been described as a "perpetual parole
system" for aliens who cannot be deported. 437 "Not only are they required
periodically to give information about their 'associates and activities' but
they must also 'conform' to 'reasonable written restrictions' on their con-
duct imposed by a district direction of the Service or a lesser official. '438
It is apparent that the Attorney General has a great amount of responsibility
in administering the supervisory provisions. For, as Maslow has suggested,
"[t] his provision [prima facie] assimilates a deportable alien to a convicted
criminal on probation." 439 And since an alien may be deported although
433. 1956 INS Annual Report 13.
434. United States ex rel. Daniman v. Shaughnessy, 117 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y.
1953).
435. § 242 (d), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (d) (1953).
436. See Shrode v. Rowoldt, 213 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1954), where an alien
placed on supervisory parol successfully demanded that the bond posted by him be
released, because more than six months had passed since the final order of deportation
had been submitted.
437. Maslow, supra note 429, at 361.
438. Ibid. Maslow recommends that an alien released pending or during a de-
portation hearing or because he cannot be deported should not be subject to any
conditions upon his lawful activity, except those reasonably designed to insure his
appearance when needed.
439. Id. at 362.
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he has never committed a crime, such a provision is repugnant to the con-
templation in our system of law that no government official shall have the
power to forbid lawful conduct. 440 If the courts do allow the Attorney
General to retain custody over the alien for any purpose other than is reason-
ably designed to insure his appearance when needed, a change in the law in
this respect definitely is required.
The courts have apparently realized such a problem, and have made
definite efforts to keep the supervisory power of the Attorney General
within the bounds of fairness. In Simonoff v. Murff, 44 1 aliens subject to
final orders of deportation which had been outstanding for more than
six months, were ordered by the District Director not to travel outside of
the New York District without reporting to the District Director within
forty-eight hours of such departure. The District Court held that "[s]uch
a provision certainly appears on its face to be a reasonable one calculated
to apprise the Immigration Service of the whereabouts of the [alien], which
they must know if an opportunity for deportation arises."442 However,
this decision was subsequently reversed,443 the court holding that
"the Attorney General's power of supervision under § 242(d) is
limited solely to assuring the availablitity of a deportable alien for
deportation when that event should become feasible; and as this super-
vision may of necessity drag on into a lifetime surveillance, the powers
granted by this section must be sparingly exercised. . . . [It is]
clear that orders issued under § 242(d) are to be held to these stand-
ards by a rather strict court review. '4 4 4
In addition, the Supreme Court has held445 that "[n]owhere in § 242 is
there any suggestion of a power of broad supervision like unto that over a
probationer. '446 Thus, it appears that the courts have almost literally
measured up to Maslow's recommendation for executing section 242 (d)
fairly. However, the courts must be firm in the approach in the future for
this provision to remain unoppressive.
440. Ibid.
441. 164 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
442. Id. at 38.
443. Simonoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1959).
444. 267 F.2d 705, 707 (2d Cir. 1959). The court further held that because the
district where the alien may go without giving forty-eight hours notice is very limited,
it is not surprising that the Service's orders worked substantial hardship and incon-
venience on him. "At a very minimum, in the plaintiffs' present circumstances an
order of this nature should be limited to notice mailed to the Service immediately
prior to a trip and applicable only to trips of some considerable distance or duration".
445. United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 77 S. Ct. 779 (1957). Here, an
alien under "supervision" under § 242 (d) was required to answer certain questions
such as "Q. Do you subscribe to the Daily Worker ?" "Do you know the editor of
the 'Narodni Glasnik'?" The lower court held that such questions were not relevant
to the aliens' availability for deportation.
446. 253 U.S. 194, 200, 77 S. Ct. 779, 782-83 (1957).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
There has been prevalent in this country, even before the signing of
the Constitution, a spirit of liberty, of freedom, of dignity of the individual.
This spirit was enshrined in, fortified and protected by the Constitution,
and its amendments. Deportation as now authorized by the McCarran-
Walter Act, in many instances, is contrary to that spirit, imposing punish-
ment, often for the slightest of reasons and without full procedural protec-
tions afforded to the basest and most guilt ridden criminal.
It is true that the welfare and internal security of the country must
be protected. Those who would do it harm must be punished. But also,
must the rights of the individual be protected. To impose an unjust punish-
ment upon a man is as much a breach of this country's principles as the
crime itself. The Constitution explicitly prohibits cruel and unusual punish-
ment, as it prohibits double jeopardy. By any standard deportation is a
punishment. It should be considered by the courts as a punishment antd
should be treated as such.
It has not been the purpose of this Note to contend that deportation
should be eliminated completely. However, it should be recognized for
what it is and the person on whom it is levied or who is in jeopardy of
suffering it, should be accorded all the protections which a criminal de-
fendant has, both before and after it is imposed. The country must remain
secure, but not make a fetish of security to the extent of depriving indi-
viduals of their rights. Great heed should be paid to the words of Justice
Jackson when he said: "Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes
committed in its name.1 44 7 If such a situation arises, the courts must inter-
vene; it is submitted that the present deportation legislation allows such a
situation to exist. That it does exist has been recognized by all the dis-
senters in deportation cases since the power was first exercised. Perhaps,
no more succinct a denunciation of the power as sweepingly exercised
today is to be found than in the words of Justice Douglas dissenting in
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy :448
An alien who is assimilated in our society, is treated as a citizen so
far as his property and his liberty are concerned .... Those guaran-
tees of liberty and livelihood are the essence of the freedom which
this country from the beginning has offered the people of all lands.
If those rights, great as they are, have constitutional protection, I
think the more important one-the right to remain here-has a like
dignity.449
447. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551, 70 S. Ct. 309, 317 (1950).
448. 342 U.S. 580, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1952). This case upheld the deportation of
three aliens for membership in the Communist Party for short periods long before
it was made a deportable offense.
449. Id. at 599. 72 S. Ct. at 524.
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Let us refer back for a moment to the words of Justice Marshall:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional.450 (Emphasis added.)
Surely the end, security and welfare of the nation and its people, is
legitimate. It is certainly within the scope of the Constitution. The means
are appropriate and plainly adopted to that end, if effectiveness is the sole
test of appropriateness. But it is submitted, the nature of deportation,
with its disastrous effects upon the individuals involved, its possibilities of
double punishment, its cruel and unusual nature, its possibility of imposition
for acts which are not criminal, make it inconsistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution and thus prohibited. Under our system of gov-
ernment the legislative and judicial branches must act to adjust the law.
The alien has little* chance of influencing the legislature. The greatest
pressure which can be brought to bear upon this body is not available to
the alien. He has no voice at the polls and no lobby. He stands in the
political spectrum on a par with the most unpopular classes. Congress
cannot readily be expected to change a law at the urging of such group.
While it is true that the ultimate remedy for our ailing deportation
law is a large scale legislative revamping of the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act, it is the judiciary which must take the initiative in indicating
their displeasure with the present law and charting the proper course of
action for the legislature. More decisions like the recent case of Rosenberg
v. Fleuti451 will be welcomed. There, one of the provisions of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act was alleged to be in violation of the "void
for vagueness" doctrine. The Ninth Circuit held the questioned provision
unconstitutional. 45 2 The Supreme Court, employing the technique of avoid-
ing the constitutional issue if the case can otherwise be decided, appeared
to spare the alien from deportation by deciding the case on other grounds.
Both the decisions of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court represent
a significant departure from the solid block of deportation law created ten
years ago. It is hoped that this type of decision will become the rule
rather than the exception. If the judiciary overrules the injustice of our
deportation process or continues to indicate its displeasure as was done
in the Rosenberg cases it will become necessary for Congress to re-examine
the objects of the law and tailor a new one consistent with recognized
constitutional principles.
When the time for revision finally arrives the legislature should think
in terms of a law which is ". . . neither arbitrary nor discriminatory,
[that] will respect the dignity of man, the sanctity of his marriage relation-
450. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 420-21 (1819).
451. 83 S. Ct. 1804 (1963). For a fuller discussion of this case and the "void for
vagueness" doctrine as it relates to deportation see section III. A of this Note.
452. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962).
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ship and the unity of his family." 453 It should be a law which recognizes
"the principle of forgiveness and the necessity of procedural fairness. 4
5 4
More specifically legislative attention should be directed towards the major
deficiencies in the present legislation. Any corrective measures which em-
body the substance of the present proposals will substantially alleviate the
crushing effect of the current deportation laws.
455
1. The doctrine that an alien knocking at our gates has no rights or
very few has been insensibly extended to the long-time resident alien whose
rights and roots in this country approximate those of a citizen. There
should be a probationary period after which an alien cannot be deported.
It would be difficult to state with exactness the length of such a period
without further information, but it should be no longer than the time
within which a presumption could be logically entertained that the alien
should have been excluded. Thus, a person who commits a crime years
after entry could not be ejected on the ground that he was a criminal when
he entered, but a person who committed a crime one month after entry
could be deported under this proposal.
2. Deportation should be recognized as penal in character and used
only as punishment for crime. Because of its drastic effect on the individual,
it should only be imposed for serious crimes or for those crimes which are
motivated by the alien's allegiance to his homeland, such as espionage.
At any time after the probationary period, the penalty should be im-
posed only for criminal offenses, never for less than criminal offences. The
crime must be such at the time it was committed and an act, innocent when
done, should never subsequently become a deportable offence.
Deportation should not be used as an adjunct to criminal law. It
should not be the extra punishment for a criminal who has already paid his
debt to society. If it is used as penalty for crime it should be the only pun-
ishment. If an alien is convicted of a crime in a state court, some procedure
should be formulated whereby such an individual would be entitled to
another trial in federal court, limited solely to the issue of the advisability
of deportation. The principles of double jeopardy would apply to this
hearing. Whether to ask for this hearing should be discretionary on the
part of the government.
3. The procedural aspects of any deportation hearing should be brought
up to the standards now available to a criminal defendant. The rules of
evidence and standards of proof should be rigidly adhered to; the full
array of constitutional procedural protections should be granted; rights of
appeal and post deportation remedies should parallel criminal appeals and
remedies. This involves the frank recognition that deportation is punish-
ment; punishment for endangering the national security. Whether labelled
a civil or administrative proceeding the trial of a deportable offense must
have all the components of the trial of a crime.
453. Wasserman, The Universal Idea of Justice and Our Inituigration Laws,
34 N.D. LAW. 1 (1958).
454. Ibid.
455. See also Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform,
56 COLUm. L. Rev. 309 (1956).
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